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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE AND GEOGRAPHY-DEFINED GROUPS ON HEALTH
INSURANCE CHOICE
Fredric E. Blavin
Mark V. Pauly
The objective of this study is to measure how language and geography-defined groups influence
participation in public health insurance programs. The theoretical model in this paper shows how
better information on insurance states, gleaned through language group contacts in one’s local
area, can help individuals decide whether or not to take up a public benefit or remain uninsured.
This study focuses on Medicaid-eligible adults and Medicaid/CHIP-eligible children who speak a
non-English language at home, and uses pooled cross-sections of the 2008-2009 American
Community Survey (ACS). Adapting an empirical method developed by Bertrand, Luttmer, and
Mullainathan (2000), I define the main variable of interest as the interaction between contact
availability, the density of an individual’s language group in an individual’s local area, and group
quality, the information and preferences related to Medicaid that an individual’s language group
may possess, as measured by the language group’s Medicaid take-up rate. The empirical
framework also uses language group and Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) fixed effects to
control for observable and unobservable differences across language groups and local areas.
The main results and sensitivity analyses strongly suggest that language and geography groups
have a statistically significant impact on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid/CHIP:
For a policy change that increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the network for these
language groups will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid by 10 percentage points for
adults and 7 percentage points for children. As eligibility expands under the Affordable Care Act
and more people in a given language group enroll in Medicaid/CHIP, the multiplier effect could
lead to higher overall program participation than might otherwise might be anticipated in a
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scenario without non-market interactions. These results can also help policymakers target
outreach funds towards uninsured non-English speakers who are eligible for public benefits.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.A

Research Objective
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that targeted efforts to increase Medicaid

or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) participation reduce ambulatory care
sensitive hospital admissions among children (Aizer 2003). In addition, compared to the
uninsured, children enrolled in Medicaid are more likely to have a usual source of care
outside of the emergency room, less likely to have unmet or delayed health needs, are
more satisfied with the care they receive, and are more likely to utilize preventive
health and dental care (Dubay and Kenney 2001). However, despite these potential
benefits and low cost-sharing levels from the enrollees perspective, millions of lowincome uninsured children and adults are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP coverage.
According to the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS), approximately 19% of
uninsured adults (39.9 million) and 71% of uninsured children (7.1 million) are income
eligible for Medicaid/CHIP coverage through either mandatory “categorically needy” or
optional “categorically related” pathways.1
While the majority of the literature attributes low take-up rates to lack of
information (e.g., not knowing about program eligibility), low perceived benefits

1

These are approximations and do not include all of the Medicaid eligibility pathways. For example, they
do not incorporate citizenship criteria or health/disability status. These issues will be further addressed in
the paper.
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associated with participation, and administrative and policy design complexities (Remler
and Glied 2003), there is a growing interest in the role of “social networks” in potentially
reducing the costs of participation (Bertrand, Luttmer, Mullainathan 2000; Aizer and
Currie 2004). Using economic theory, a new data source, and well-established empirical
methods, this is the first study to measure the effects of “networks”, defined by
language group behavior and geographic location, on individual health insurance takeup decisions.
Researchers in sociology and economics tend to use the terms “social networks”,
“social interactions”, “peer effects”, and “neighborhood effects”, interchangeably. In its
simplest form, social interactions are defined as direct non-market interactions between
individuals that can potentially influence individual choices and economic outcomes
such as use of physician services (Moffitt 2001; Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981). In this
study, social interactions, such as conversations between friends related to Medicaid
benefits, are unobservable to the researcher, whereas networks, defined by the agents
for whom individuals rely upon for social interactions, are defined with available data
sources. For the purpose of this study, the concept of networks is defined very broadly
and provides a noisy signal about social interactions, but the application is specific to
language-geography groups.
Focusing on the low-income, Medicaid-eligible population, this study uses nonEnglish language spoken at home and geographic location to proxy for the social links
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between individuals and explores if there is a causal effect of language group behavior
on an individual’s probability of taking-up seemingly free Medicaid/CHIP benefits
relative to being uninsured. Borrowing from Bertrand et al. (2000), the main variable of
interest in this paper is defined as the interaction between contact availability, the
density of an individual’s language group in an individual’s local area, and group quality,
the information related to Medicaid/CHIP that an individual’s language group may
possess, as measured by the language group’s Medicaid take-up rate. A simple example
demonstrates this approach. For an individual that is part of a high Medicaid/CHIP takeup language group (e.g., above the mean), living among a high concentration of his/her
language group can increase the person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid. For
example, suppose a Cantonese speaker migrates to the U.S. and lives in an area that his
heavily concentrated with other Cantonese speakers. Because Cantonese speakers in
the U.S. as a whole have a high Medicaid take-up rate, these potential contacts in the
local area can provide information related to the benefits of enrollment relative to being
uninsured. In contrast, for those, such as Koreans, that are part of a low take-up group
(e.g., below the mean), living among a high concentration of the language group can
decrease the person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid relative to living among a low
concentration of the language group. These potential contacts might believe that costs
of enrollment outweigh the benefits (e.g., it is more convenient to remain uninsured
and utilize necessary care from safety net providers), and could discourage the
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individual from enrolling. It is also possible that living among a high concentration of
the language group increases the probability of take-up, regardless if the person is from
a low or high take-up group. However, the differential effect on the probability of takeup will be larger among those that are part of a high take-up group, as these groups
might possess more practical knowledge (e.g., information related to eligibility and
necessary documentation) that could help the individual enroll in Medicaid. In other
words, the main question for this study is as follows: What is the differential effect
(between low and high take-up language groups) of living in areas of high concentration
of a common language group on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid?

While language groups could influence the decision to obtain private health
insurance, this paper does not focus on this outcome for two main reasons. First,
networks could only indirectly influence rates of employer-sponsored health insurance
(ESI) through labor market decisions, and several other studies have already measured
network effects in the labor group (e.g., Ioannides and Loury 2004). Earlier versions of
this paper tested the same methodology with ESI instead of Medicaid, but did not find
any statistically significant results. Second, language group behavior could potentially
influence decisions in the individual non-group market by reducing search costs and
spreading information. However, the proportion of non-group enrollees that speak a
non-English language is relatively small, and ACS does not contain sufficient information
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(e.g, ESI offer information) to determine eligibility for the individual non-group market.
As such, the main independent variable of interest would capture unobservable
characteristics that influence an individual’s likelihood of searching for coverage in the
individual non-group market.
This question is relevant for several reasons. First, Medicaid eligibility and
language spoken at home are important; the number of adult and children who speak a
language other than English at home has substantially increased over the past few
decades (U.S. Census Bureau and American Community Survey, 1979-2008). Currently,
approximately 12% of adults are eligible for Medicaid, 26% of whom speak a non-English
language at home, and 50% of children are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP, 32% of whom
have a mother who speaks a non-English language at home.2 Demographics are
shifting, and those who speak a non-English language at home have different behavioral
patterns and experience different outcomes than English-speakers; for instance,
children without English-speaking parents are less likely to take-up Medicaid/CHIP
relative to children with English-speaking parents (Kenney et al. 2010).
Second, sociological research suggests that people who speak a non-English
language at home interact mainly with others who speak that language, and are more
closely linked than individuals who merely share the same ethnic background (Alba

2

Author’s tabulation of the 2009 ACS. Medicaid eligibility is determined by state income thresholds. See
chapter 4 for more details.
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1990; Lazear 1995). For example, several studies explored the impact of racial and
ethnic group behavior on individual outcomes, but given high levels of variation within
racial and ethnic groups as opposed to across groups (e.g., as a group, Asians might
behavior similarly to Whites, but there is considerable variation among Asians who
speak Japanese, Hmong, Cambodian, Hindi, etc…), it is very difficult to come up with
accurate theoretical predictions and empirical estimates. This is consistent with the fact
that on the ACS, Cantonese adults and children have relatively high take-up rates,
whereas Korean adults and children have some of the lowest take-up rates. Similarly,
immigrant populations may lack knowledge about the U.S. health care system and could
be more likely to rely on those who speak a common non-English language for
information related to Medicaid benefits. Characteristics of health care systems, such
as levels of out-of-pocket spending and the efficacy of government financing, vary
across countries of birth and can create similar levels of information or attitudes
towards government-sponsored health insurance programs such as Medicaid/CHIP
within a given language group. This study primarily focuses on language groups, but
also explores the strength of country of birth networks.
Third, there is considerable variation in Medicaid/CHIP participation both across
and within states (Kenney et al. 2010) and geography can play an important role in
determining the strength of a language group’s network effect. This is one of the first
studies to utilize the new health insurance coverage questions (added in 2008) on the
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American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS is a particularly rich survey because it also
includes identifiers for public use microdata area (PUMA) of residence, which are
geographic units within states that contain at least 100,000 people, and more
aggregated residence measures such as super-PUMAs (areas of 400,000 people) and
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). No other major surveys that produce health
insurance estimates, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS), or Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), contain such
detailed geographic identifiers. The ACS also contains identifiers for language spoken at
home, citizenship status, country of birth, and other socio-demographic characteristics
that can help identify and determine the strength of network effects. Because of these
unique variables, along with the fact that each ACS cross-section contains more than 3
million individuals, I can directly control for language groups and local areas
characteristics.
Fourth, there are timely policy implications associated with this study. Effective
January 1, 2014, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expands Medicaid eligibility so that
states must cover adult citizens up to 138 percent of federal poverty level (FPL),
primarily affecting non-parents who are currently ineligible. This portion of the ACA
could have a large impact on the majority of states, as only 11 states have eligibility
thresholds for parents exceeding 133 percent FPL and more than half of states do not
provide Medicaid coverage for childless adults (Artiga, 2009). Even though the number
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of uninsured is projected to decrease by 32 million, 23 million residents are predicted to
remain uninsured by 2019, including those who are eligible for Medicaid but do not
take-up the benefits (CBO, 2010). Language groups could play an important role in
influencing take-up, as over 2 million newly eligible adults speaks a non-English language
at home.3 Additionally, a top Obama administration priority is to ensure that uninsured
children are enrolled in Medicaid or the CHIP program (Sebelius 2010); as part of the
CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009, $100 million dollars were allocated to outreach and
enrollment activities. The results from this study could assist states in developing
practical policy tools, such as direct advertising campaigns, aimed at these groups could
affect individual behavior directly and indirectly through a network multiplier-type
effect.
Finally, this paper is motivated by the theoretical and empirical challenges
associated with measuring the causal effects of group behavior on individual economic
outcomes. The framework aims to convince the reader that language-geography
defined groups have a causal impact on an individual’s probability of taking-up
Medicaid. This framework unambiguously predicts that an exogenous increase in
Medicaid take-up (e.g., improved outreach efforts through the ACA) will increase the
individual’s probability of take-up, but more so for those that live in high contact
availability areas. Holding all else constant, however, an exogenous increase in contact
3

Author’s tabulation of the 2009 ACS.
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availability of an individual’s language group will have an ambiguous effect on an
individual’s probability of take-up.
1.B

Roadmap
Chapter 2 gives a review of the existing literature, describes the Medicaid take-

up process, and elucidates the key contributions of this study. Few studies explore the
role of networks in influencing health insurance choice and none focus on
Medicaid/CHIP take-up as an outcome or language-geography as the measure of
networks. The first part of this chapter (2.A) reviews the literature related to the takeup of government benefits with a focus on Medicaid and CHIP. As a whole, these
studies show that take-up rates vary considerably by income levels, expansion or
eligibility type, geography, and other individual or family characteristics. As mentioned
in 1.A, the reasons for not taking-up Medicaid/CHIP also vary. This study expands on
this literature by providing new take-up estimates using the ACS (overall and by
language group) and exploring how language and geography can impact an individual’s
probability of taking-up benefits. The second part of this chapter (2.B) reviews the
theoretical and empirical research related to networks and economic outcomes. The
theoretical literature shows that networks influence individual economic outcomes
through the spread of information, social learning, imitation, and stigma reduction via
the spread of social norms. The empirical literature explores a wide range of outcomes
and empirical methods, with the former ranging from crime to earnings to obesity, and
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the latter ranging from experiments to instrumental variables to fixed effects models.
Given the wide variety of studies, this section will primarily focus on the papers with
similar outcome variables (e.g., health insurance choice or the take-up of government
benefits), network definitions such as language and race/ethnicity, and empirical
methods.
I develop a formal expected utility maximization model in Chapter 3 to better
understand the mechanisms by which language and geography influence health
insurance outcomes. In this model, individuals face the choice of taking-up
Medicaid/CHIP benefits or being uninsured. The model incorporates the expected
private utility and a multiplicative network utility associated with each choice that
illustrates how networks provides information on a language group’s common tastes,
knowledge related to health care options, and valuation of Medicaid benefits relative to
being uninsured. The model predicts that an increase in a language group’s Medicaid
take-up rate is associated with an increase in the individual’s probability of take-up,
whereas an increase in a language group’s uninsurance rate is associated with an
increase in the individual’s probability of being uninsured. An increase in contact
availability has an ambiguous effect on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid
and depends on the difference in magnitude of the total utility associated with Medicaid
take-up relative to being uninsured; living in a high CA area could increase the
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probability of take-up among high take-up groups, whereas the opposite may be true
among low take-up groups.
The major empirical challenge associated with this study is to properly identify
the causal effect of one’s language-geography network on health insurance outcomes.
While it is easy for researchers to find correlations between individual outcomes and
mean language group or neighborhood outcomes, it is much more challenging to
demonstrate that networks have a causal effect on individual behavior. As a simple
illustration, I ran two “naïve” OLS models, where the dependent variable is a 0/1
indicator for taking-up Medicaid, and the main network variables were either the mean
Medicaid rate within language groups (language group effects) or the mean Medicaid
rate within PUMAs (neighborhood effects). Even after controlling for individual and
household-level characteristics, the coefficient on these network variables range from
.70 to .95 depending on the model. These coefficients are statistically significant at the
1 percent level, but do not provide a causal estimate of network effects; they are merely
correlations that may be attributable to unobservable individual, neighborhood, or
language group characteristics. These correlations can be characterized as the
“reflection problem”, where individual behavior determines group behavior, and not
vice versa (Manski 1993).
However, additional omitted variable biases could remain. For example, it is
possible that differential geographic sorting among individuals or outreach efforts that
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are correlated with the main variable of interest could be also explain the main results
from this paper. Chapter 4 further describes these omitted variable biases and
identification issues (4.A) and presents the data sources (4.B) and empirical framework
(4.C) used to address these challenges. Chapter 4.B describes the data and the
development of the core and expanded samples. There are two core samples:
Medicaid eligible adults (19-64) who speak a language other than English at home and
Medicaid/CHIP eligible children who live in a non-English household (defined by the
mother’s language). Both samples exclude individuals with private or other public
health insurance. The expanded sample analyses include those with private health
insurance and are more theoretically sound because some individuals face multiple
health insurance choices. However, the results in the core sample are easier to
interpret and are consistent with the results from the expanded sample. Chapter 4.C
describes the empirical models, inspired by Bertand et al. (2000) who created a unique
measure of language-geography networks in the context of welfare use and used
language group and local area fixed effects to control for unobservable language group
and local area characteristics, respectively. This study primarily uses linear probability
models4 where the dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator for Medicaid take-up (core
sample) or being insured (expanded sample). I also explore multinomial logit models
with the expanded sample where Medicaid, any private health insurance, or being

4

I also use logit and probit models as specification checks.
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uninsured are the three choice outcomes for the dependent variable. This chapter also
describes multiple sensitivity and sub-sample analyses associated with the main model,
including the use of local area characteristics instead of fixed effects and interactions of
these characteristics with the network variable.
The results from this dissertation reveal that language-geography defined
networks have a strong impact on the probability that an individual takes-up
Medicaid/CHIP benefits. Chapter 5 presents the core sample, expanded sample, and
sensitivity analyses for adults and children. The regression coefficient on the main
network variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all of the main
models and remains robust across the vast majority of the sensitivity analyses.
Interpretation of these coefficients, especially in the multinomial logit model, is not
straightforward because the key independent variable is an interaction term between
two continuous variables. The most intuitive way to interpret the network coefficient is
to view it as a policy multiplier effect: The core model results imply that for a
hypothetical policy change that increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the
network for these language groups will increase the probability of having Medicaid by
10 percentage points for adults and 7 percentage points for kids.
Chapter 6 summarizes and highlights the main results, policy implications, key
contributions of the dissertation, study limitations, and areas for future research. From
a policy perspective, changes such as Medicaid expansions or marketing campaigns can

14

have a direct effect on Medicaid/CHIP take-up and an indirect multiplier-effect through
language-geography networks. This result implies that CMS can achieve “more-bang-fortheir-buck” in areas that have a high concentration of language groups that are more
likely to value Medicaid relative to being uninsured as a whole. However, in order to
maximize Medicaid/CHIP take-up, if desired, CMS would need to devote additional
marketing and outreach resources towards language groups that are currently
uninformed about government health insurance and/or have low perceived benefits or
high face costs of enrollment. The results also imply that it will be more difficult or
costly to convince uninsured “hermit-types”5 to enroll in Medicaid or CHIP.

5
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter reviews the most relevant existing literature related to the take-up
of Medicaid/CHIP benefits and the role of networks influencing individual economic
outcomes. The goal of this chapter is to identify the main contributions of this paper,
given the gaps in the existing literature. Readers should refer to Klees, Wolfe, and Curtis
(2010) for additional background information related to Medicaid, such as eligibility
rules, scope of services, amount and duration of services, and payment issue.

2.A

The Take-Up of Government Benefits
It is widely known that some of the uninsured, adults and children alike, are

eligible for “free” public coverage. Most recently, Kenney et al. (2010) estimated that
7.3 million children were uninsured on the 2008 ACS, of whom 4.7 million or 65% were
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP but not enrolled.6 The authors use the Urban Institute
Health Policy Center’s ACS Medicaid/CHIP Eligibility Simulation Model to determine
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility. This dissertation uses a different methodology to define
eligibility (see Chapter 4), but obtains consistent eligibility and take-up estimates.
Kenney et al. (2010) also found that participation rates substantially varied across

6

Similar to this study, Kenney et al. (2010) defines participation as the ratio of eligible children enrolled in
Medicaid/CHIP to those children plus uninsured children who are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP.
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states, ranging from 55% to 95%, and individual/household characteristics. Most
relevant to this study, the authors estimated participation rates of 83% among children
with at least one English-speaking parent in the home, compared to 77% among
children without any English-Speaking parents in the home.
Other studies produce take-up estimates ranging from 50-70% and find take-up
decreases as Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds increase. By 1996, the
Medicaid take-up rate among eligible children was approximately 70% (Gruber 2003;
Selden et al. 1998). This translates into 4.7 million uninsured children that were eligible
for Medicaid benefits during this time period (Selden et al. 1998). Another study found
that the percent of children eligible for Medicaid increased by 15 percentage points
between 1984 and 1992, but the fraction covered increased by only 7.4 percentage
points (Currie and Gruber 1996a). Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Currie and Gruber
(1996b) also found that among newly eligible children and women of childbearing age,
only 23% and 34%, respectively, took up public coverage. Using the CPS and SIPP,
another study found that the OBRA 1990 expansion led to an 8-percentage point rise in
Medicaid coverage for children just inside the eligibility limits, and a similar rise in
coverall health insurance (Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004). The authors concluded that
the effect of Medicaid expansions was limited by low take-up rates among newly eligible
children rather than by the crowding out of private health insurance. Similarly, LoSasso
and Buchmueller (2004) estimate SCHIP take-up rates ranging from 8 to 14 percent
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among the newly eligible populations, and hypothesize that the newly eligible
population may not be aware of their benefits especially if they had not previously
participated. However, many of these children were already covered by other sources
of health insurance.
Individuals do not take-up government programs because of high transaction
costs due to administrative barriers and/or low perceived benefits. Two major literature
reviews (Currie 2006; Remler and Glied 2003) conclude that take-up could be hindered
by administrative barriers, lack of information, and “stigma” associated with
government programs. However, both studies conclude that administrative barriers
matter the most, whereas stigma does not have significant effect on take-up. The
literature reviews also found that larger program benefits have a positive effect on
participation. For example, Ettner (1997) finds that elderly people with chronic
functional limitations are four times more likely to take-up Medicaid than those without
limitations. Similarly, many physicians do not treat publicly insured because of relatively
low reimbursement rates (Currie 2006), which can alter a patient’s valuation of
Medicaid benefits relative to being uninsured. The bullets below summarize some of
the key findings on why eligible populations do not take-up government benefits:
Administrative barriers: Up to a quarter of Medicaid applicants cannot produce
the necessary documentation (e.g., birth certificate, citizenship papers, proof of
residency, and proof of income) within the required time or fail to attend all of
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the required interviews necessary to receive Medicaid benefits (GAO 1994).
Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that some of these
small hassles and procrastination might explain why some individuals do not
take-up program benefits (Bertrand et al. 2004), whereas changing the program
design to utilize the existing tax system might make enrollment easier for eligible
populations with income levels above the tax filing threshold (Congdon et al.
2011).
The results from regression analyses show that measures of
inconvenience, such as perceived application length, hinder take-up, while
policies such as presumptive eligibility, which lower inconvenience costs, have a
significant positive impact on take-up. Design mechanisms-eliminating asset
tests, offering continuous eligibility and coverage, simplifying the application and
renewal processes, and extending benefits to parents--have large statistically
significant positive effects on CHIP take-up rates, while mandatory waiting
periods reduce take-up (Bansak and Raphael 2006). Wolfe and Scrivner (2005)
obtain consistent results and also find evidence suggesting that specific outreach
activities can have a positive effect on SCHIP take-up. However, the validity of
these results is questionable due the small number of policy changes relative to
the long time-frames for each study and the fact policy changes tend to be
correlated with state budgetary considerations. In a much more
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methodologically sound study, Aizer (2003) examines Medicaid enrollment in
California from 1996 to 2000 and the timing and placement of community-based
application assistants that were part of a 2008 outreach campaign. She finds
that application assistance programs had a large impact on Medicaid
enrollments, particularly among Hispanic (4.6 percent) and Asian (6 percent)
children relative to other children in the same community.
Information: Medicaid eligibility rules are complex and individuals can qualify
through a number of pathways, some of which are required by federal law and
others are optional for states (Artiga 2009; Hearne 2005).7 While most parents
might have heard of Medicaid or CHIP, they do not necessary know of details
related to benefit levels and eligibility. Proxies for information, such as
educational attainment, provide weak results. Some evidence shows that those
who are confused about Medicaid eligibility rules are 1.8 times less likely to takeup Medicaid (Stuber et al. 2000). Learning over time might also occur as lagged
eligibility has a greater effect on take-up than current eligibility (Yelowitz 2000).
This is consistent with the relatively low take-up estimates among the newly
eligible populations who might not be aware of their benefits.
Stigma: Stigma can be defined as the psychological feeling of shame or a social
sense of disrespect associated with program participation (Remler and Glied

7

See chapter 4 for a more in-depth analysis of Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules.
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2003), or to put it in simpler economic terms, the disutility arising from
participation in a welfare-related program per se (Moffit 1983). Moffit (1983)
models non-participation in government programs as a utility-maximizing
decision, where the main cost is the stigma associated with participation.
Despite having a compelling theoretical underpinning, empirical measures of
stigma are difficult to interpret and the results are generally weak (Remler and
Glied 2003). Stigma associated with Medicaid/CHIP participation would also be
difficult to separate from stigma associated with having sufficiently low income
to be eligible in the first place.
2.B

Theory of Networks and Economic Behavior
Network theory can be broadly divided into two categories: The theory behind

network formation and the theory behind how networks impact economic outcomes. In
the most simplisitic model of network formation, individuals interact with others in their
network if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. More formally, Jackson (2005)
and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show the net utility ui(g) that person i receives from a
network g is

ui ( g )

(
j i

ij

)

pij ( g )

cij
j i:ij g

Where pij(g) is the number of links in the shortest path between individuals i and j, cij>0
is the cost to maintain a direct relationship with person j, and δij is a factor between 0
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and 1 that indicates the benefit from a direct relationship with person j and is raised to
higher powers for more distant relationships. For example, consider a network where
person 1 is linked to 2, 2 is linked to 3, and 3 is linked to 4; person 1 gets a benefit of δ12
from the direct connection with person 2, a benefit of (δ13)2 from the indirect
connection with person 3, and a benefit of (δ14)3 from the indirect connection with
person 4. Since δij < 1, there is a lower benefit from an indirect connection than a direct
one. However, individuals only pay costs for maintaining direct relationships whereas
indirect relationships are costless. The model also shows which networks are efficient
and which networks are likely to form when individuals choose their own links as
modeled through pairwise stability. A network is pairwise stable if no player wants to
sever a link and no two players both want to add a link in the network.
It is important to note that the power relationship between δij and pij(g) can only
be empirically tested when complete data on the network structure are available. In
this study’s empirical analysis, actual direct and indirect connections within each
individual’s network are unobserved and therefor I assume network formation is
exogenous. In other words, this dissertation assumes that individuals are born into
language groups and area of residence is exogenous8, with this latter assumption tested
through various sensitivity models.

8

Or endogenous, but in a way that is uncorrelated with health insurance choice.
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The more pertinent models relate to how networks influence individual
economic outcomes. Sociologists have had a major influence on this area of network
research (Granovetter 1973; 2005) and have developed similar prediction as economics:
networks affect the flow and quality of information and networks influence behavior
through the spread of social norms. While some economists have analyzed how
networks influence individual outcomes through social norms, such as peer pressure,
role models, stigma, or social approval (For example, see Akerlof 1980; Lindbeck et al.
1999; Besley and Coate 1992; Moffit 1983), this section, and dissertation as a whole,
focuses economic models that explain how networks influence individual behavior
through the spread of information.
Bala and Goyal (1998) develop a model of Bayesian learning where agents use
their own past experience as well as the experience of their neighbors to guide their
decision making. Through various assumptions, the authors show that in a connected
society, “local learning ensures that all agents obtain the same payoffs in the long run”
and eventually converge to choosing the same action. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993)
develop a model of social learning where agents take into account the experiences of
their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use. Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995) also examine how word-of-mouth communication accumulates information of
individual agents and may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average
superior, depending on what people are saying. These models are specific to
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technological adoption but they illustrate how social learning can lead to different
outcomes among heterogeneous groups.
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) describe how networks influence
individual behavior through imitation of behavior. Both of these models make
predictions of individual behavior based on information from groups or previous
decision makers. Banerjee (1992) analyzes a sequential decision model in which each
agent looks at the decisions made by previous agents before making their own
decisions. The model produces an inefficient equilibrium where people do what others
are doing rather than using their private information. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) find
that localized conformity of behavior can be explained by informational cascades, which
occur when it is for an individual to follow the behavior of the preceding individual
without regard to his own information.
Networks can also be viewed in the context of search costs. Pauly and
Sattherwaite (1981) show that the reputation of a physician is formed through
information shared between consumers. They find that a higher number of physicians
lowers the ratio of friends per provider, and therefore increases search costs because
consumers communicate with others to learn the reputation of the providers.
Empirically, they look at primary care physician services and show that increasing the
number of sellers leads to price increases. In the context of electronic marketplaces,
Bakos (1997) views networks as an intermediary between the buyers and sellers in a
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market, creating a marketplace that lowers the costs to acquire information about seller
price, product details, and product availability.
2.C

Network Empirical Applications
There is little to no literature on how language and geography influence the

probability of taking up Medicaid or having health insurance in general. However, there
are several studies that explore how language, race/ethnicity, and geography influence
different economic outcomes. There are also a myriad other studies, both within and
outside the field of health economics, that test the role of networks, peer, or
neighborhood effects in various markets.
The empirical method in this dissertation is motivated by studies that explore
how language and geography-defined networks influence welfare use and health care
utilization. The empirical framework for this paper is derived from Bertrand et al.
(2000), who examine the role of networks in welfare participation using data on
language spoken at home and geography to define networks. The authors hypothesize
that, by reducing the stigma associated with welfare use and through the spread of
information, being surrounded by high welfare-using contacts increases the individual’s
welfare recipiency more than being surrounded by low welfare-using contacts. They
use the number of people in one’s local area who speak one’s language to measure
contact availability and the mean welfare use of the language group as a proxy for
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network quality. The interaction between these two variables (network
quality*network quantity) defines they key variable of interest. They also control for
local area and language group fixed effects. Their results imply that networks would
raise the responsiveness of welfare take-up policy shocks by 15-27%. Deri (2005) uses a
similar method to estimate the impact of language-geography networks on health care
utilization among immigrants in Canada. She finds that networks have an impact on
health care utilization and that the utilization of services by immigrants increases with
the number of physicians who speak their language in their neighborhood. One of her
key results is that a policy that increases the use of regular doctors by 1 percentage
point will increase the probability of having a regular doctor in the language group
network by 4.9 percentage points.
Aizer and Currie (2004) analyze the effects of networks on the utilization of
publicly-funded maternity care in California. They define networks using 5-digit zip
codes and a woman’s racial or ethnic group. The outcome they focus on is whether
women who went on to have a public delivery used public services beginning in the first
trimester of their pregnancies. The authors find correlations between individual use of
publicly-funded maternity care and group use. They run various models, including one
similar to Bertrand et al (2000), and find that the correlations still exist. However, the
authors reject the hypothesis that the estimated network effects represent information
sharing within groups. They find that network effects persist even among women who
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already knew about the services because they had used it in the past. Unfortunately,
this study is limited by a loose definition of networks (ethnicity), lack of data on other
Medicaid eligible groups besides pregnant woman, and lack of data beyond California.
Several other papers attempt to measure how language and racial/ethnic group
behavior influence individual behavior. Gresenz, Rogowski, and Escarce (2007) find that
for Mexican-American immigrants, living in an area populated by relatively more
Hispanics, more immigrants, or more Spanish-speakers increases access to care (e.g.,
usual source of care and number of office visits). The authors believe that this is
facilitated by the flow of information among people in the local area about where to go
for care and what processes to use to get there. They also find that the network effects
are stronger for more recent immigrants compared to those who are more established
in the U.S., and find no effects on access to care for U.S. born Mexican-Americans.
Devillanova (2008) uses a dataset with large sample of undocumented immigrants in
Milan and contains a direct indicator of information networks-whether an immigrant
was referred to health care opportunities by a strong social tie. The dependent variable
in this analysis is the log of time spent in Italy before an immigrant first utilized health
care. The key network variable is a dummy indicating whether or not the individual
came in contact with Naga, a voluntary association which offers free primary care to
irregular immigrants, through a strong social network of friends or relatives. Overall,
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the author finds that networks significantly accelerate health care utilization, reducing
the time to visit by about 30%.
Borjas (1992, 1995) introduce ethnic capital into an economic model of
intergenerational mobility. The author defines the dependent variable as the child’s
educational attainment level (or earnings) and defines the key independent network
variable as the mean educational attainment of the ethnic group of the father’s
generation. Borjas and Hilton (1996) use a similar method to show that that types of
public benefits used by an ethnic group’s previous generation can predict those used in
the current generation. However, this methodology does not sufficiently control for
unobservable personal and ethnic group characteristics that might be correlated with
the network variable.
To investigate the effect of ethnic capital in the context of this study, one can
regress individual health insurance status on the mean health insurance status of the
ethnic group in the previous generation (along with observable individual and ethnic
group characteristics). However, this type of model, and the model used by Gresenz,
Rogowski, and Escarce (2007), suffers from two omitted variable biases: (1) Omitted
personal characteristics may be correlated with the network variable and (2) Omitted
ethnic group characteristics may be correlated with the network variable (Bertrand et al.
2000). This study includes both neighborhood and language group fixed effects in
order to avoid biases associated with omitted language/ethnic group and neighborhood
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characteristics. In addition, networks defined by language group as opposed to ethnic
group provide a more precise measure of social links because ancestry can often include
individuals who are loosely connected to their ethnic group (Alba 1991; Lazear 1995).
These econometric concerns are further discussed in Chapter 4.
To the author’s knowledge, only one other study explores the effects of
networks on health insurance outcomes. Using panel data from the University of
California, Sorensen (2006) quantifies the impact of social learning on individuals’ choice
of employer-sponsored health plans. To avoid simultaneity problems, the author
focuses on the choices of newly hired employees and assumes their health plan choices
are influenced by coworkers, but not vice versa. Sorensen finds that health plan choices
are correlated across individuals within the same department. He also uses discrete
choice models and finds large and statistically significant social learning effects that are
robust across campuses and model specifications.
There are also several related neighborhood effects studies to note. One study
finds that socioeconomic factors, including the racial composition of an area or its
income level, can have independent effects beyond the sum of the effects of the race
and income of individuals in the area (Subramanian and Kawachi 2004). This result is
consistent with the Gautreaux Experiment (Rosenbaum 1995) and Moving to
Opportunity Experiment (MTO, Katz et al. 2001; Ludwig et al. 2001). Gautreaux was a
US housing desegregation projected initiated by court order. Public housing residents
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were essentially randomly assigned to neighborhoods (urban and suburban) in Chicago
in order to mitigate high concentrations of poverty. Rosenbaum (1995) found that
women allocated to better, typically suburban, neighborhoods experienced better
outcomes, e.g., they were more likely to find employment and leave welfare. Due to its
initial success, the Gautreaux experiment became a model for similar programs in
various metropolitan areas and inspired the national MTO program. MTO was a true
random assignment demonstration. Initial results are suggestive of strong
neighborhood effects on child problem behaviors, child and adult health outcomes, and
juvenile crime (Katz et al. 2001; Ludwig et al. 2001).
Pagan and Pauly (2006) find that community-level uninsurance rates are
positively associated with having reported unmet medical needs, but only for insured
adults. They find that, on average, a five percentage point increase in the local
uninsured population is associated with a 10.5 percent increase in the likelihood that an
insured adult will report having unmet medical needs during the 12-month period
studied. Pauly and Pagan (2007) further expand and conclude that reducing the size of
the uninsured population yields important spillover benefits to the insured population
that go beyond a lower charity care burden e.g., the quality of care available to
everyone locally as a result of the low demand for quality by the uninsured.
Finally, the existing literature shows that social networks play an important role
influencing individual behavior in labor markets, as a means of matching workers and
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firms9 (Ioannides and Loury 2004), crime, as a way of explaining the high variance of
crime rates across time and space (Glaeser et al. 1996), retirement plan decisions (Duflo
and Saez 2003), juvenile behavior (Gaviria and Raphael 2001), educational attainment
(Sacerdote 2001; Evans et al. 1992) and obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007). This
chapter concludes with a discussion of the key findings and methodological
contributions of some of these studies.
The use of randomized or natural experiments highlights how networks can alter
the flow of information. Duflo and Saez (2003) used a randomized experiment to
analyze the role of information and social interactions in employees’ decisions to enroll
in a Tax Deferred Account (TDA) retirement plan within a large university. The
experiment provided financial incentives to a random sample of workers within a
random subset of departments to attend a TDA information fair sponsored by the
university. The nature of the experiment allowed the authors to compare results among
treated individuals in treated departments, untreated individuals in treated
departments, and untreated individuals in untreated departments. The experiment
increased the attendance rate for treated individuals by five-fold relative to the
controls, and tripled the attendance rate for untreated individuals within treated
departments. The authors also found that effect on TDA enrollment is almost as large
for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the financial incentive as for
9

This study will not focus on employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) as an outcome because ESI rates are
largely explained by labor market decisions
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those who did. This result can be attributable to differential treatment effects, social
network effects, and motivational reward effects. Sacerdote (2001) finds strong
evidence for the existence of peer effects in student outcomes at Dartmouth College.
Using data on freshman year roommates and dormmates, both of which are randomly
assigned, he finds that peer effects in GPA occur at the roommate level and peer effects
in fraternity membership occurs at the roommate and dorm level.
Christakis and Fowler (2007) and Fowler and Christakis (2008) use a panel of
interconnected networks as part of the Framingham Heart Study to determine if obesity
is spread through person-to-person interactions. They use a panel logistic regression
models in which the “ego’s” (the individual) obesity status is a function of various
personal attributes, including lagged obesity status, and the “alter’s’” (e.g., friend,
sibling, or spouse) current and lagged obesity status. They use generalized estimating
equations to account for multiple observations of the same ego across examinations
and “ego-alter” pairs. They find that a person’s chances of becoming obese increased
by 57% if he/she had a friend who became obese in a given time interval. They also
obtained similar findings from siblings (40%) and spouses (37%).
Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008) respond by arguing that Christakis and Fowler
(2007) fail to control for contextual effects, creating spurious inference on the social
networks effect. The authors are able to replicate a similar model and obtain similar
results from Christakis and Fowler (2007) using the Add Health panel dataset, a national
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sample of 7th-12th graders who transition into early adulthood. Their first model did not
control for school-specific trends that account for any environmental factors shared by
individuals at the same school. After including school-level fixed effects, the authors
find a large drop in the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient of
interest. Trogden et al. (2008) also use the Add Health panel to estimate peer effects
for adolescent weight. They control for the endogeneity of peer groups by using a
combination of school fixed effects, instrumental variables, and alternative (exogenous)
definitions of peers. Even after controlling for endogenous peer effects, they find that
mean peer weight is correlated with adolescent weight. The conflicting results from
these obesity studies highlights the theoretical and econometric challenges associated
with network-related studies.
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Chapter 3: Theory
In this chapter, I build a model that illustrates how language and geographydefined networks shape health insurance choices. Better information on insurance
states, gleaned through the network, can help consumers decide whether or not to take
up a Medicaid benefit or remain uninsured.
3.A

Assumptions
Networks can play an important role in providing consumers with information

related to health insurance choices. Health insurance products can be complex and vary
across geographic markets; consumers must make choices based on risk and can choose
policies with various levels of benefits, price schedules, deductibles, networks, and/or
coinsurance rates. Similarly, some individuals do not take-up Medicaid benefits because
of administrative barriers (high transaction costs), lack of information and perceived
benefits, and “stigma” associated with government programs (see Chapter 2 for more
information). The model described below illustrates how language-geography networks
influence individual outcomes by providing information on the value of health insurance
choices among the individual’s language group.
A simple theoretical model of expected utility maximization illustrates this
behavioral effect. This model builds on the stylistic features (expected utility
maximization model) from Herring (2005) and some of the social interaction
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mechanisms from Brock and Durlauf (2001). Herring (2005) developed a simple utility
maximization model that predicts how the existence of charity decreases the propensity
to purchase private health insurance. Brock and Durlauf (2001) study generalized
logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of
individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an environment of non-cooperative
decision-making. The following assumptions characterize the key features of the model:
To clarify, this model deviates from the random utility framework in Brock and
Durlauf 2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2002)10, even though these models have
nice econometric properties associated with logit and multinomial logit models,
respectively. There are two main reasons for this. First, expected utility
maximization models are widely used when dealing with choices related to risk
and uncertainty and the predictions from this type of model are intuitive and
clear-cut relative to the theoretical complications associated with the models in
Brock and Durlauf. Second, while using a non-linear logistic framework might be
more theoretically sound, it creates multiple complications for empirical
implementation. The main network variable, an interaction of two continuous
variables, is much easier to interpret with a linear probability model (LPM).
LPMs also have much more flexibility in terms of using fixed effects relative to

10

See McFadden (1974, 1981) for a discussion of random utility models.
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the non-linear counterparts. Chapter 4 provides a more in-depth discussion and
Chapter 5 compares the results from LPMs, logit, and multinomial logit models.
This model focuses on the Medicaid-eligible population whom speak a language
other than English at home and assumes these individual’s face the choice of
taking up Medicaid or being uninsured. These assumptions make the model
more tractable, but can be relaxed to incorporate more than two choices or
different populations.
The model also assumes that individuals face a disutility from the total amount
of medical care expenses and the valuation of risk associated with the variation
in the amount of expenses. For simplicity, the model assumes each individual
faces the full cost of medical expenses if they are uninsured. The existence of
uncompensated care (in many instances, Medicaid will retroactively reimburse
hospitals for treatment of those who are uninsured but eligible) reduces the
realism of this assumption, however, the Medicaid eligible population does face
non-zero medical expenses and risk and this parameter captures the benefit of
coverage relative to being uninsured.
Network formation is exogenous and in a state with imperfect information, each
individual interacts with others in their common language group and local area.
Exogenous network formation is a fair assumption due to the fact that
individuals are born into language groups and differential selection across
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geographic areas does not appear to be a major issue (See Chapter 4 for a more
detailed discussion of this issue). The sociological and economic literature also
strongly suggests that non-English speakers mainly interact with others in their
common language group.
Conditional upon eligibility, language groups with higher Medicaid/CHIP take-up
rates are presumed to have a greater knowledge about the program. This
assumption is sensible because it merely relates knowledge about
Medicaid/CHIP with actual experience and encounters with the program. In
other words, this assumption implies that language groups with higher take-up
rates know more about important Medicaid/CHIP details such as eligibility rules,
application requirements, and potential benefits of coverage.
Each individual derives utility from the beliefs about the behavior of others in his
language group. The model assumes individual is influenced by what he thinks
others in his group are doing via expectations derived by composition of his local
area, not by their actual behavior per se.
For comparison purposes, this model assumes there are two states of the world,
one where consumers are perfectly informed about characteristics of each
health insurance choice, and one where consumers are imperfectly informed. I
assume that there are no social interaction effects in the former, whereas
individuals rely on their language group for information in the latter.
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The model uses the following indices: individual , language group , and local
area
3.B

The Model
The expected utility of an uninsured individual facing uncertain costs of medical

care can be expressed as

(1)

Where

is ’s income,

is the total amount of health expenses, and

ex-ante valuation of risk due to the variation in the realization of
Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient and

is the
is the Arrow-

is the variance of . For further

discussion on the valuation of risk, see Feldman and Dowd (1991) on the derivation and
Herring (2005) and Pauly, Blavin, and Meghan (2009) for additional applications.
The expected utility of individual if fully insured by Medicaid in this state of the
world is
(2)
Where

are the total costs associated with Medicaid take-up.

includes any

premium and cost sharing that individual may face and indirect costs (e.g., time and
hassle costs) associated with taking-up Medicaid.
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Individual chooses to take-up Medicaid if

>

. Individual ’s

propensity for taking-up Medicaid, as defined as the difference between expected
utilities, is expressed as
(3)

In other words, consumers are more likely to take-up Medicaid if the expected benefit
of doing so, measured by the decrease in medical expenses and risk, is greater than the
expected cost.
Now, suppose that each individual faces imperfect information related to the
costs and benefits of Medicaid relative to being uninsured and relies on his/her
language group for information. In the presence of social interactions, the sum of
private and social utility for individual if uninsured is:

(4)

Where
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(5)
Equation (4) shows that each consumer receives more utility from being uninsured if
they expect a higher proportion of their language group to be uninsured. The term
embodies a multiplicative interaction between the expected private utility
associated with being uninsured and the expected social utility associated with being
uninsured.

is the expected average choices from individual ’s perspective of the

proportion of his/her language group that is uninsured and

is the actual de-

meaned group uninsurance rate, which proxies for the language group’s valuation of
being uninsured as a whole (e.g., the language group’s cultural beliefs, physical
characteristics, and experience with health insurance schemes in native country that
shape the language group’s proclivity towards being uninsured relative to taking-up
Medicaid). As equation (5) illustrates, each individual does not directly observe the
actual insurance choices of his/her language group. Rather, they receive a signal of this
valuation, which depends on the proportion

of the person’s local area that belongs

to the same language group. This concept is referred to as contact availability
throughout the paper.
Similarly, the expected total utility of taking-up Medicaid in the presence of
social interactions is
(6)
Where
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(7)
Equations (6) and (7) show that the expected utility associated with Medicaid take-up
has a multiplicative social interaction effect, with a converse explanation to the one
described in the previous paragraph. Intuitively, as

increases, more information

related to Medicaid (e.g., eligibility and enrollment requirements for take-up) flows
through a language-geography group and influences each individual’s expected utility of
take-up.
Each person chooses to take-up Medicaid if

>

. In addition, consistent

with the method used in (3), individual ’s propensity for taking-up Medicaid is defined
as the difference between expected utilities:

(8)

(9)
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Differentiating the propensity to take-up Medicaid, as expressed by (9), by

,

, and

, respectively, yields the following testable hypotheses:
(10)
(11)

(12)

(13)

Equation (11) shows that an exogenous increase in a language group’s Medicaid
take-up rate is associated with an increase in an individual’s propensity towards
participating in Medicaid. In contrast, (12) shows that an exogenous increase in a
language group’s uninsurance rate is associated with a decrease in an individual’s
propensity towards participating in Medicaid.
Equations (12) and (13) illustrate how contact availability has an ambiguous
effect on the propensity to participate in Medicaid. An increase in a person’s contact
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availability is associated with an increase in the propensity towards taking up Medicaid
if the total utility (individual utility plus social utility that incorporates language group
behavior) associated with taking-up Medicaid is greater than the total utility associated
with being uninsured. Combining these first-order conditions leads to the following
testable hypothesis: Being surrounded by a high Medicaid utilizing language group
increases an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid more than being surrounded
by a low Medicaid utilizing language group.
It is important to note that this model does not explicitly predict what the impact
of being surrounded by others who are part of another language group besides one’s
own. However, the results imply that being surrounded by a high concentration of any
language group that has a high take-up rate could have a positive impact on the
individual’s probability of take-up. This is consistent with the “naïve” regression results
mentioned in the introduction and further discussed in Chapter 5. These results show
that the take-up rate in one’s local area (overall, regardless of language) has a very
strong and positive impact on the individual’s probability of take-up. However, this
independent variable captures several local area omitted variables that are correlated
with the main independent variable.
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Chapter 4: Empirical Framework

4A.

Data

Household and Individual-Level Microdata
This analysis uses pooled cross-sections of the 2008-2009 public use microdata
sample (PUMS) of the Census’ American Community Survey (ACS). I downloaded and
analyzed an augmented version of the survey, the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS), from the University of Minnesota Population Center (Ruggles et al.
2010). The ACS is part of the reengineered decennial census program and provides
detailed information every year instead of every ten years. ACS data are collected
continuously using independent monthly samples and are designed to produce
nationally representative economic, social, demographic, and housing information
(Turner et al. 2009). The ACS samples approximately 1.3 million housing and 3 million
person records annually throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico. The survey is
administered using a mixed-mode approach-over half of the sample is completed by
mail and the rest is completed by telephone or in person-and has a reported response
rate of 98% in both years (Kenney et al. 2010; U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
This analysis is feasible because of the uniqueness and size of the ACS data. The
U.S. Census Bureau has been conducting the ACS over the past decade, but only recently
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added a question related to health insurance status for each individual in the household
in 2008. To the author’s knowledge, it is the only nationally representative survey that
contains information on health insurance coverage, language spoken at home, and
detailed geographic area of residence. The health insurance question on the ACS
questionnaire is in Figure 1.
Research suggests that the that ACS coverage estimates are valid and highly
consistent with other federally-funded representative surveys such as the Current
Population Survey (CPS), Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS) (Turner et al 2009). However, there is a concern that the survey
understates Medicaid and CHIP coverage relative to the other surveys because the ACS
does not specifically mention CHIP or provide names for state’s particular Medicaid and
CHIP programs (Kenney et al. 2010). This could create confusion between Medicaid and
private non-group coverage, leading to an underestimate of the former and an
overestimate of the latter. To address this underreporting, in addition to the known
underreporting of public coverage on household surveys in general, I applied a modified
set of logical edit rules that were developed by the U.S. Census Bureau (Lynch et al.
2010). These edits, displayed in Figure 2, have also been harmonized to analyze changes
over time (Ruggles et al. 2010). However, it is important to note that the regression
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results in Chapter 5 are insensitive to the use of these edits11, which provides evidence
to favor the notion that Medicaid underreporting is uncorrelated with language and
geography.
The ACS has a distinct advantage over the CPS, MEPS, and NHIS because of its
large sample size (approximately 3 million individuals or 1% of the US population) which
allows for estimation at the local area level. Whereas the other surveys only allow
estimation at the national, state, or census region level, the ACS contains identifiers for
public use microdata areas (PUMAs), which consist of populations of approximately
100,000 individuals, super-PUMAs, areas with approximately 400,000 individuals, and
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), which are larger urban areas that could contain
multiple PUMAs.12
In addition to the geographic identifiers and health insurance variables, the ACS
also contains information on each individual’s language spoken at home. According to
both the 2008 and 2009 ACS data, approximately 20% of the non-elderly population
speaks a language other than English at home (close to 100 different languages). The
ACS also contains key individual, household, and family socio-demographic
characteristics such as on citizenship status, year person came to live in the U.S.,
11

Data not show. The results from the data without the logical edits were used in the dissertation
proposal and are highly consistent with the final results.
12
MSA identifiers are derived from a crosswalk created by the Missouri Census Data Center
(http://mcdc.missouri.edu/webrepts/geography/). PUMAs that belong to multiple MSAs are assigned to
the MSA with the largest Census population.
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migration status, country of birth, age, sex, race, marital status, disability status13,
educational attainment, income, household size, level English fluency, occupation,
industry and work status. Given the large sample size of the ACS, I am able to produce
neighborhood characteristics, such as racial composition, income, and education, at the
PUMA and MSA-level.
The ACS also contains individual and household-level sample weights that can
be used to produce statistics representative of the population. This study uses the
weights to produce descriptive statistics in 5.A and mean-level variables (e.g, language
group take-up rate), but does not use them for the regression analysis. The reason for
this is because when sampling weights are solely a function of independent variables
included in the model, which they are in the ACS, unweighted ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates are preferred because they are unbiased, consistent, and have small
standard errors than weighted OLS estimates (Winship and Radbill 1994). However,
when weights are used in a sensitivity analysis, they produce results that are consistent
with the unweighted models.

Other Data Sources

13

The ACS contains six questions asking if the respondent has serious difficulty hearing, seeing,
concentrating/remembering/making decisions, walking or climbing stairs, dressing or bathing, and doing
errands.
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I obtained 2008 and 2009 Medicaid/CHIP eligibility thresholds, determined by
the maximum percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) within a state for Medicaid/CHIP
or similar programs (e.g., premium assistance), for parents, non-parents and children
from the Kaiser Family Foundation (Cohen Ross and Marks 2009a; Cohen Ross et al.
2009b). Figure 3 shows how eligibility thresholds vary by state and familial status. For
example, eligibility for parents varies from 24% FPL in Alabama to 300% FPL in
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont, and eligibility for children ranges
from 160% FPL in North Dakota to 400% FPL in New York. In addition, childless adults
are eligible for Medicaid or Medicaid-related benefits in 24 states.
I use state-level data from Zuckerman et al. (2009) and Hill et al. (2009) as part of
the sensitivity analysis discussed in Chapter 4.C. Zuckerman et al. (2009) collect data
on average fee by state and procedure and develop a state-level Medicaid Fee Index.
This measure is used as a proxy state generosity and access to care for adult and child
Medicaid beneficiaries. However, it is important to note that the empirical effects of
Medicaid fee-for-serve payment generosity on access to care are modest (Shen and
Zuckerman 2005). Hill et al. (2009) assessed state Medicaid program efforts to reach
out to and enroll pregnant women into coverage. Their survey found that 30 states
produce outreach materials in multiple languages in 2007 and I use this as a proxy for
state outreach levels among those that speak a non-English language at home.

48

There are also several hypothetical or ideal data sources that could improve the
strength of the empirical strategy described below. First, data at a more detailed
geographic level (e.g., zip code or census track) could improve the precision of the
estimation equations and provide a clearer picture of an individual’s actual
neighborhood or community relative to a PUMA. It would also be ideal to have better
data related to other potential network definitions (e.g., characteristics of co-workers,
church or community membership, etc…) and other health insurance outcomes (e.g.,
participation in Medicare advantage or private non-group coverage). For example, if
the necessary data pieces were available in the Health and Retirement Study, it would
be fruitful to test if language-geography groups influence participation in Medicare
Advantage plans. This estimation strategy would also be more precise given the fact
that 100 percent of the elderly population is eligible for Medicare.

4B.

Sample and Sub-Sample Definitions
This dissertation conducts core and expanded sample analyses for adults and

children. The core adult sample includes Medicaid-eligible parents and non-parents
(determined by FPL thresholds in Figure 3), aged 19 to 64, who speak a language other
than English at home and are either covered by Medicaid or are uninsured. The sample
also excludes individuals that are part of smaller language groups, defined as those with
less than 1,000 individuals in the ACS sample (e.g., Cebuano), in order to have sufficient
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sample size for PUMA-level contact availability estimates. The results are insensitive to
the choice of this cutoff level. The core adult sample includes 59,300 individuals
(7,755,281 weighted) among 41 language groups living in 1,877 PUMAs (522 SuperPUMAs and 283 MSAs). The expanded adult sample analysis includes those with private
health insurance, (either employer-sponsored or directly-purchased nongroup
coverage), increasing the sample size to 83,906 unweighted or 10,786,093 weighted
adults.
The core child sample includes Medicaid/CHIP eligible children (determined by
FPL thresholds in Figure 3) under 19 who live in a non-English household and are either
covered by Medicaid/CHIP or are uninsured. The household language is determined by
the language spoken by the child’s mother because investments in children’s health are
made largely by a child’s mother (Case and Paxson 2001). The sample also excludes
children that are part of smaller language groups. The core sample includes 136,542
children (17,459,492 weighted) among 43 language groups living in 2,044 PUMAs (531
Super-PUMAs and 299 MSAs). The expanded sample includes those with private health
insurance, increasing the sample size to 192,414 unweighted or 24,047,763 weighted
children.
This study also focuses on several sub-samples as a part of the sensitivity
analysis. An obvious concern is that the results could be exclusively driven by the
behavior of Spanish-speakers because they comprise the majority of the sample. A
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simple solution is to exclude Spanish-speakers from the core and expanded samples.
Similarly, I also exclude several outlier language groups, such as the Yiddish and
Pennsylvania Dutch speakers. I also test how sensitivity the results are to changes in
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility definitions e.g., focusing on all adults and children who are
under 200% or 300% FPL.
This study also addresses several concerns related to immigration and citizenship
status. The core sample includes citizens and non-citizens even though most
immigrants are subject to a five-year ban on eligibility and undocumented immigrants
are generally ineligible.14 Legal permanent residents are ineligible for Medicaid/CHIP
during their first five years in the U.S. and become eligible afterwards if they meet the
programs’ other eligibility requirements. However, some immigrants (e.g., refugees and
humanitarian immigrants) are exempt from the bar and are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP
regardless of their length of residence and 17 states and D.C. have used state funds to
provide coverage to recent immigrants who would otherwise be ineligible (Cohen Ross
and Marks 2009a; Cohen Ross et al. 2009b). The ACS contains information on
citizenship status (but not undocumented vs. documented), years since entry in the U.S.,
and country of birth. As part of the sub-sample analysis, I exclude non-citizens, focus on
the foreign born population (and define networks by country of birth), and focus on
recent immigrants (<5 years in the U.S.). The latter two sub-sample analyses are related
14

Some states use CHIP funds to prove prenatal care to pregnant women, regardless of immigration
status. In addition, emergency treatment is available to all immigrants, regardless of status (Kaiser 2006).
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to econometric identification concerns and are further discussed in 4.C. I also estimate
a model that excludes recent immigrants (<5 years) who live in states where they would
be presumably ineligible.

4C.

Empirical Strategies

The Identification Problem
Several papers (Manski 1993; Manski 2000; Moffitt 2001; Hartmann et al. 2008)
highlight the identification problems associated with network, peer, neighborhood, and
social interaction effects studies. Networks are difficult to measure, as few data sets
have information on actual contacts, and those that do are typically endogenous
because most individuals choose their own contacts. Empirical researchers are
therefore challenged to separate the correlations in observed behavior from the true
causal effects of one agent (or agents) behavior on another. The “reflection problem”,
as noted by Manski (1993), occurs because it is difficult to disentangle the direction of
causation between average group behavior and behavior of one of its members. The
following OLS model highlights the identification problems associated with group
behavior models:
(14)
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Where

is a 0/1 binary variable indicating Medicaid take-up,

up rate for group language group j (or local area j),
characteristics, and

is the take-

is a vector of individual

is the error term. One might naively interpret

as the effect of

language group or local area Medicaid take-up behavior on individual take-up behavior.
I ran this “naïve” model on the ACS data and, even after controlling for individual and
household-level characteristics, the estimated coefficient

was .77 for adults and .96

for children and were statistically significant on at the 1% level. When I defined
at the local area level, the estimated coefficient on

was .76 for adults and .85 for

children and were statistically significant on at the 1% level. However, this equation is
plagued by the “reflection problem” and

captures group behavior effects, what the

researcher is interested in measuring, and unobservable effects, what the researcher
needs to disentangle.
Correlation between group behavior and individual outcomes might be
attributable to correlated unobservables that drive agents in the same reference group
to behave similarly. These unobservables might drive exogenous effects, where the
propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the exogenous
characteristics of the group, and correlated effects, where individuals in the same group
tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face
similar institutional environments (Manski 2000). Correlated effects can include
common levels of education and income or access to health insurance, whereas
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exogenous effects can include a genetic predisposition to heart disease among a
language group that is correlated with the demand for health insurance. These
unobservables are controlled for by using language group and local area fixed effects,
along with several sensitivity models discussed later in this section.
The endogenous group formation problem is a subset of correlated effects and
arises because agents with similar tastes tend to form social groups. As a result,
correlation between group and individual behavior may reflect these common tastes,
and not a causal effect of one on the other (Hartmann et al. 2008; Moffitt 2001). This
problem is self-evident in studies that attempt to measure how peer behavior influences
individual outcomes. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Christakis and Fowler
(2007) claim that obesity is a contagion that spreads through social networks. Studies
like this might make it to the popular press (see “How Friends Make you Fat”15), but do
a poor job controlling for endogenous group formation. Endogenous group formation is
not a major problem in this dissertation because individuals are generally born into
language groups and because I am not attempting to measure a direct peer effect; I
merely assume that others who are part of a common language group are potential
social contacts as opposed to claiming that individual A is friends with individual B, and
individual B’s behavior is causally influencing individual A’s behavior. However,

15

Rushin, Steve. “How Friends Make you Fat.” Time August 2, 2007:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1649321,00.html
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differential geographic sorting within a language group could create an upward bias in
the main network variable coefficient. This problem is addressed later in the chapter.
The rest of this chapter describes the empirical strategy and how this
dissertation deals with these identification issues.

Estimation Equations for Core and Expanded Samples
This dissertation uses two years of pooled cross-sectional data and a similar
empirical strategy as Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005). The main independent
variable in the model varies by each local area-language group combination; the
variable is defined by the interaction term between contact availability (the density of
each individual’s language group in their local area) and the Medicaid take-up rate for
each individual’s language group. Because this variable is unique to each local arealanguage group combination, the model can include dummy variables for each local
area and language group (fixed effects), which controls for biases associated with
omitted local area and language group characteristics, respectively16.
To reiterate, the interaction term (contact availability*language group take-up)
measures the differential effect (between low and high take-up language groups) of

16

To clarify, I am including dummy variables for each language group and local area. I am not using panel
data.
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living in areas of high concentration of a common language group (relative to low
concentration areas) on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid. For an
individual that is part of a high Medicaid/CHIP take-up language group (e.g., above the
mean), living among a high concentration of his/her language group can increase the
person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid. In contrast, for those that are part of a low
take-up group (e.g., below the mean), living among a high concentration of the language
group can decrease the person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid relative to living
among a low concentration of the language group. These potential contacts might
believe that costs of enrollment outweigh the benefits (e.g., it is more convenient to
remain uninsured and utilize necessary care from safety net providers), and could
discourage the individual from enrolling. It is also possible that living among a high
concentration of the language group increases the probability of take-up, regardless if
the person is from a low or high take-up group. However, the differential effect on the
probability of take-up will be larger among those that are part of a higher take-up
language group, as these groups might possess more practical knowledge (e.g.,
information related to eligibility and necessary documentation) that could help the
individual enroll in Medicaid.
To measure the effects of language-geography defined groups on Medicaid takeup, I estimate the following OLS model for the adult and child core samples:
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(15)
Where
(16)
(17)

In equation (16),

is a binary variable equal to one if eligible individual i,

who lives in local area j and is part of language group k, takes-up Medicaid and equal to
zero if they are uninsured.

is the main network variable,

(“contact

availability") is the direct effect for the quantity of contacts available to individual i (this
variable also varies over time, but the results are insensitive to this choice),

is a

vector of individual and household characteristics (including year in survey),
local area (PUMA, Super-PUMA, or MSA) fixed effect, and
effect. The direct effect

is the

is the language group fixed

drops out of the estimation equation because of the

language group fixed effects. For all models, I use robust standard errors clustered at
the local area and language group level. A positive estimate of

provides evidence in

favor of the causal effect of networks on Medicaid take-up.
Equation (17) shows that the main network variable is defined as the interaction
between contact availability
Medicaid take-up rate

and network quality, as measured by the mean
for language group k. As discussed in Chapter 3,
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proxies for the knowledge, information, and attitudes towards Medicaid of
others from the language group k that live in area j.

is calculated for each

language group (it does not vary by local area) within the sample and is taken in
deviation from the sample global take-up rate. The coefficient on the network variable
is the same either way, but subtracting the global mean facilitates interpretation of the
coefficient on the CA measure base effect. In addition, in order to increase sample size
and precision, I estimate the language take-up variable over the combined two-year ACS
file. It is also important to note that I do not have enough sample size to define
language group take-up at the PUMA-level or the state-level in some cases. Even if
there was sufficient sample size to do so, this measure would be endogenous to
unobservable differences across local areas; Language group take-up defined at the
national level is comparatively more exogenous, however, results are robust to the
specification where take-up is defined at the more local level (see Chapter 5). One
limitation of this study is that I am unable to identify a potential exogenous source of
increased Medicaid take-up. While a couple of states changed their Medicaid eligibility
rules between 2008 and 2009, these changes were relatively small and took place in
states with relatively small non-English speaking populations.
The numerator for the contact availability measure in equation (18) is the share
of the population in area j that are part of language group k and the denominator is the
share of the total United States’ population that is part of language group k. Contact
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availability is calculated among all individuals in the ACS file, not just among the
Medicaid eligible sample. The denominator in (4) prevents under-weighting of smaller
groups; without it, small groups would appear to have very small contact availability
because even at full concentration, they would never be a large fraction of any area
(Bertrand et al. 2000). However, the results are robust to the specification without the
denominator. I use the natural log transformation so that the CA variable has a normal
distribution. Otherwise, distribution for the untransformed variable is heavily skewed
with a large spike close to 0 and with a long right tail.
I also test for multicollinearity between
effect

and the base

by calculating condition indices. An informal rule of thumb is that if the

condition number is 15, multicollinearity is a concern and if it is greater than 30,
multicollinearity is a very serious concern. I find that multicollinearity is not a concern
for these variables, as further discussed in Chapter 5, because the condition index is
sufficiently low.
In the adult sample, the X i ’s include the following individual and household
characteristics: Year in sample, gender, age, educational attainment, race and ethnicity,
marital status, family structure and size, income relative to poverty, work status, selfemployed status, occupation, English fluency, MSA status, citizenship status, number of
functional limitations, welfare use, and foreign born status. The child sample includes
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similar covariates, but educational attainment and work status are defined at the
household level.
I estimate a similar OLS model for the expanded sample analysis:
(18)
Where

is a binary variable equal to one if the individual has any health

insurance and zero otherwise.

is the same as in (17), but is estimated among

the entire expanded sample as opposed to the core sample that excludes those with
private health insurance.

is defined in the same manner as (18).

Addressing Identification Concerns
Under an ideal scenario, I would use an experiment to causally identify the
effects of language and geography on Medicaid take-up. For example, similar to the
Gautreaux experiment, I would randomly assign non-English speakers to neighborhoods
with varying levels of own language group contact availability. This type of experiment
would identify the causal effects of contact availability (e.g., neighborhood effects), but
it would not perfectly identify the effects of language group quality; the true ideal
experiment that would randomize individuals into neighborhoods and language groups.
These experiments are not feasible for this dissertation.
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Alternatively, if the ACS health insurance questions went back further than 2008,
I could take advantage of the early Medicaid and SCHIP expansions (e.g., 1997 to 2001
when states were implementing SCHIP) as a natural experiment to identify exogenous
participation in public programs among various language groups. Similarly, as part of
future research, I can expand on the methods from this paper to examine if there are
any language-geography network effects associated with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
for adults under 138 percent of the FPL. However, this natural experiment would
provide an exogenous shock in Medicaid participation, but it would not exogenously
influence an individual’s geographic location. A potential natural experiment would be
to further explore migration patterns (e.g., natural disaster in country X leads to an
exogenous displacement of a population in city Y of country Z) to identify how random
shocks in contact availability affect Medicaid take-up.
Given the limitations of the data at hand, empirical identification relies on two
assumptions. First, an individual’s PUMA residency is exogenous, or at least
uncorrelated with the decision to participate in Medicaid. Second, language groups
exogenously form (e.g., individuals are born into them) and language group take-up
rates serve as a proxy for each language group’s knowledge and proclivity towards
participating in Medicaid relative to being uninsured. The main strength of this model it
includes both language group and local area fixed effects, which is possible because the
main network variable is an interaction term. The PUMA dummies control for omitted
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local area characteristics and unobserved differences between areas, the language
group dummies control for omitted language group characteristics and unobserved
differences between groups, and the main CA effect controls for other unobserved
characteristics e.g., ambition, which may reduce the likelihood of having insurance and
the probability of living among one’s language group. The rest of this section highlights
specific examples identification concerns and discusses how the empirical strategy
address each of these issues.
There is potential for differential geographic sorting, where people who live in
areas of high density of their language group are different in some unobservable way
from people who live in low density areas, but in a way that is correlated with health
insurance rates. In other words, there are omitted individual characteristics that are
correlated with the key network variable. One solution to differential sorting is to
construct the network and CA variables at the larger super-PUMA and MSA levels and
use the corresponding local area fixed effects. Comparable estimates between these
models and the main estimation model provides evidence that differential sorting is not
driving the main results, assuming that MSA or super-PUMA location is exogenous,
whereas the exact location within the MSA or super-PUMA (e.g., PUMA) can be a choice
variable. If differential sorting is driving the results, the estimates from (19) and (19) are
biased upwards relative to super-PUMA and MSA model. I also address sorting issues by
comparing the network effects among those who moved in the past year vs. those who
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stayed in the same home and those who are recent immigrants vs. those who have been
in the U.S. for longer periods of time.
A second method to address differential sorting is to include controls for number
of years since entry (YSE) into the U.S. and interaction terms between YSE and language
group. This model controls for the omitted variable biases associated with immigrant
behavior over time. For example, recent immigrants might be more likely to initially
locate in high CA areas and might be more homogenous relative to other immigrants.
Over time, immigrants start to relocate in a way that is consistent with differential
sorting (Deri 2005). Similarly, a regression model limited to recent immigrants (e.g.,
those who have been in the U.S. for less than two or five years) can avoid the same type
of omitted variable bias.
Similarly, comparing the results with

defined at the national level versus

at the MSA-level provides insight into whether or not language-group take-up is
exogenous. In (16) and (19), take-up is defined at the language-group level among the
Medicaid/CHIP eligible population. If the results drastically change when

is

defined at the MSA-language group or super PUMA-language group level, there might
be some concerns that there is selection taking places across MSAs.
There are several other potential alternative explanations of the results that I
address. First, individuals might sort based on health status in a way that is correlated
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with take-up. I address this concern by running separate models for the disabled and
non-disabled populations. Another alternative explanation of the results might be due
to supply-side behavior of Medicaid offices. A large concentration of a high Medicaidusing language group in an area may lead to CMS to hire more people in that area who
speak that language, or to start an advertising or outreach campaign targeted towards
specific language groups. Individuals in that language group and area will face lower
search costs and might be more likely to take-up Medicaid benefits. This alternative
explanation also predicts a positive coefficient on the main network variable. To avoid
this problem, I limit the sample to Spanish speakers only and define the CA and network
variables based on country of birth.17 This model assumes that those who are born in
the same country are more likely to interact with one another, and the empirical model
predicts a positive coefficient on the main network variable. However, the supply-side
explanation predicts no effect because everyone in the sample speaks the same
language. The only way that supply-side behavior can drive the results is if CMS starts to
differentially target individuals based on their country of birth as opposed to language.
Another potential solution is to exclude states (e.g., NY and CA) that are known to have
extensive Medicaid/CHIP outreach efforts or states that are known to have outreach
efforts in multiple languages to see if the coefficient on the main network variable
drastically changes.
17

The country groups for this model include those from Puerto Rico, Spain, Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Local Area Characteristics
While the fixed effects models can effectively deal with identification concerns,
models (16) and (19) hide how local area characteristics are correlated with the
Medicaid take-up decision. The fixed effects model also prevents the researcher from
exploring how network strength varies depending on local area characteristics or state
policy choices. To provide insight into what is going on behind the scenes, I remove the
PUMA fixed effect

and replace it with a vector of PUMA characteristics. These

characteristics include average age, the percent of the PUMA that is non-white, the
percent of the PUMA living in poverty, and the percent of the PUMA that is foreign
born. I also calculate the condition index associated with these variables to determine if
multicollinearity is a concern. Given that the condition index is close to 50, I run the
model with one characteristic at a time.
I also test if network strength varies by type of neighborhood by dividing the
sample into quintiles based on PUMA characteristics. For example, I explore if network
effects are stronger in lower-income or geographically smaller neighborhoods. I also
use the state-level Medicaid fee index and language outreach dummy and interact each
with the network variable to test if networks are stronger in states that have less
generous Medicaid programs or weaker outreach efforts, respectively.
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Model Specification Checks and Other Sensitivity Tests
I also check to see if the results differ when using non-linear binary models (logit,
probit). For the expanded sample analysis, I use a multinomial logit similar to (19) that
includes private health insurance as an additional choice outcome. However, there are
two major disadvantages with non-linear models. First, it is practically difficult to
estimate nonlinear models with fixed effects (they do not merge in Stata) and
methodologically, the incidental parameters problem raises questions about the
statistical properties of the estimators (Greene 2002). Second, while the multionomial
logit might be the more theoretically “correct” model, interpreting an interaction term
with two continuous variables is not a straightforward process (See Ai and Norton
2003). In Chapter 5, I compare the OLS results with various non-linear models and find
that the results are consistent and comparable.
I also explored potential private health insurance network effects by adding an
additional network variable to the expanded sample in equation (19). However, given
the theory in Chapter 3 and the fact that my sample focuses on the Medicaid-eligible
population, there is no a priori reason to believe that private health insurance defined
networks will have an impact on the probability that an individual is insured. The
majority of the privately insured obtain coverage from their employers; networks can
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either indirectly influence this choice through labor market decisions or directly through
the choice of plan type once already employed, as shown in Sorenson (2003). However,
I do not have the data to explore these options and the private insurance network
variable may suffer from multiple omitted variable biases, such as employer-offer
status. In addition, some individuals may rely on networks to obtain information on
health insurance products in the nongroup market. However, coverage rates in the
private nongroup are relatively small, especially among the low-income population.
Overall, I find no statistically significant effects associated with the private health
insurance network variable (results not shown).

Interpretation
This section describes how to interpret the coefficients obtained in equation
(16). 18 This is not a straightforward process because the key variable of interest is the
interaction between two continuous variables. Using the same interpretation used in
Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005), can be viewed as a policy such that a 1percentage point increase in leads to a 1-percentage point increase in Medicaid use in
the absence of networks. Changes in policy lead to a direct effect on Medicaid ( ) and
an indirect effect via networks. Intuitively, an increase in the policy variable raises

18

A parallel explanation can be used to interpret equation (19).
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, which in turn raises each individual's Medicaid probability through a feedback
or network effect. Examples include a Medicaid eligibility expansion or a targeted
advertising/outreach campaign designed to increased Medicaid take-up.
Mathematically, averaging both sides (2) by language group k and differentiating
with respect to yields:

(19)

Solving for the change in Medicaid use for each language group for a policy
change t and subtracting 1 for the direct effect yields:

(20)

Overall, the multiplier effect is stronger (positive or negative) for higher average
levels of contact availability and higher coefficients on the network variable. If the
coefficient on the network variable is negative, higher contact availability has as
stronger negative effect on an individual’s probability of take-up, whereas if the
coefficient on the network variable is positive, higher contact availability has as stronger
positive effect on an individual’s probability of take-up. The regression result tables in
the next chapter include policy multiplier estimates for each OLS model and sub-sample.
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The following chapter contains the results for all of the models described
in this chapter and interprets the main variable of interest. There are also a few
additional sensitivity tests that were not mentioned in this chapter.
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Figure 1: American Community Survey Question on Health Insurance

Is this person CURRENTLY covered by any of the following types of health insurance or
health coverage plans? Mark "Yes" or "No" for EACH type of coverage in items a – h.
a. Insurance through a current or former employer or union (of this person or
another family member)
b. Insurance purchased directly from an insurance company (by this person or
another family member)
c. Medicare, for people 65 and older, or people with certain
disabilities
d. Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those
with low incomes or a disability
e. TRICARE or other military health
care
f. VA (including those who have ever used or enrolled for VA
health care)
g. Indian Health
Service
h. Any other type of health insurance or health coverage
plan – Specify
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2008-2009.
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Figure 2: Details of the IPUMS Health Insurance Edits
*Persons who did not claim to be covered by Medicaid were assigned Medicaid
coverage if they were:
1. Less than 19 years old and the unmarried child of a parent with public assistance
and/or Medicaid;
2. A citizen parent with public assistance;
3. A citizen parent married to a citizen with public assistance and/or Medicaid;
4. A foster child; or
5. A Supplemental Security Income (SSI) enrollee living in a state where SSI enrollees
are automatically enrolled in Medicaid and who satisfies one of the following three
additional conditions:
Does not have children
Has children but is disabled and/or not working
Group quarters resident.
*Persons who did not claim to be covered by Medicare were assigned Medicare
coverage if they were at least 65 years old and satisfied at least one of the following
conditions:
1. Reported Social Security or Railroad Retirement Benefits
2. Reported Medicaid coverage.
*Persons who did not claim to be covered by TRICARE or other military insurance were
assigned such coverage if they were:
1. Active duty military;
2. The spouse of an active duty military person and did not report other private
coverage; or
3. Less than 21 years old, lacking in other private coverage, and the unmarried child of
an active duty military person.
*Persons who gave direct reports (i.e., unallocated) of employer-based, privately
purchased, military, Medicaid, and Medicare coverage had:
*VA coverage changed to "No" if the person was not a veteran; and
*IHS coverage changed to "No" if the person did not identify American Indian / Alaska
Native as their only race.
Notes:
(1) IPUMS-USA, Health Insurance Variables in the American Community Survey,
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/acs_healthins.shtml. Accessed on February 23rd, 2011.
(2) Lynch V, Bourdreaux m, and Davern M. Applying and Evaluating Logical Coverage
Edits to Health Insurance Coverage in the American Community Survey. Suitland (MD):
U.S. Census Bureau, July 2010.
(3) Unless otherwise noted, "parent" refers to a person with a child under age 18.
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Figure 3
2008-2009 Medicaid Income Limits as a Percent of FPL
Parents
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

24%
81%
106%
200%
106%
66%
300%
121%
207%
53%
50%
200%
185%
185%
200%
250%
32%
62%
25%
300%
116%
300%
64%
275%
44%
25%
56%
58%
200%
49%
200%
250%
150%

Childless
Adults
N/A
N/A
110%
200%
N/A
N/A
300%
110%
211%
N/A
N/A
200%
185%
N/A
200%
250%
N/A
N/A
N/A
300%
116%
300%
45%
250%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
250%
100%

Children
(2008/2009)
200%
175%
200%
200%
250%
205%
300%
200%
300%
200%
235%
300%
185%
200%
250%
200%/300%
241%
200%
250%
200%
300%
300%
200%
280%
200%
300%
175%
185%
200%
300%
350%
235%
400%
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North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

49%
59%
90%
200%
185%
208%
181%
89%
52%
129%
26%
150%
300%
29%
200%
33%
200%
52%

N/A
N/A
N/A
200%
185%
213%
N/A
N/A
N/A
129%
N/A
150%
300%
N/A
200%
N/A
200%
N/A

200%
160%
200%
185%
300%
300%
250%
200%
200%
250%
200%
200%
300%
200%
250%/300%
220%/250%
300%
200%

Sources: (1) Kaiser Family Foundation, statehealthfacts.org (2) Cohen
Ross, Jarlenski, Artiga, and Marks (2009)
Note: Thresholds are the maximum among Medicaid or Medicaid lookalike programs, programs more limited than Medicaid, and premium
assistance with work-related eligibility requirements.
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Figure 4
State-Level Data for Sensitivity Analyses

State

Medicaid Fee
Indexes for All
Services
(2008)

US

1.00

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

1.10
2.05
1.45
1.10
0.83
1.19
1.44
1.44
0.87
0.89
1.21
1.04
1.33
0.90
0.90
1.22
1.20
1.10
1.24
0.81
1.27
1.30
0.90
0.98
1.14
0.94
1.33

Has Outreach in
Multiple
Languages
(2007)?

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
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Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1.24
1.46
0.98
0.58
1.42
0.62
1.27
1.30
0.94
1.28
1.18
0.98
0.59
1.24
1.19
N/A
1.01
1.08
1.25
1.23
1.28
1.12
1.07
1.81

Source: Zuckerman et al. (2009); Hill et al. (2009)

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
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Chapter 5: Results
5A.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1A shows weighted descriptive statistics for the core and expanded adult

samples. Overall, there are 59,377 unweighted adults (7,755,281 weighted) in the core
sample and 83,906 unweighted adults (10,786,093) in the expanded sample. Overall, a
non-trivial proportion of the sample has access to private health insurance: 36.7% of
the core sample has Medicaid and 63.3% is uninsured, whereas 26.4% of the expanded
sample has Medicaid, 28.1% has any private coverage, and 45.5% is uninsured. Relative
to the core sample, the expanded sample includes a higher proportion of adults with at
least some college education (30.5% vs. 23.6%), a lower proportion of Hispanics (65.4%
vs. 71.4%), and a lower proportion of individuals with family income below the poverty
rate (61.8% vs. 68.7%).
Table 1B is the child equivalent to Table 1A. The child sample is substantially
larger than the adult sample because Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules are more generous
for children. There are 136,542 unweighted children (17,459,492 weighted) in the core
sample and 192,414 unweighted children (24,047,763) in the expanded sample. Overall,
children have higher rates of Medicaid coverage compared to the adult samples: 71.6%
of the core child sample has Medicaid and 28.4% is uninsured, and 52% of the expanded
child sample has Medicaid, 27.4% has any private coverage, and 20.6% is uninsured. In
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addition, consistent with the statistics in Table 1A, the expanded child sample has higher
levels of education (defined at the family-level) and income compared to the core child
sample.
Appendix 1A and 1B include the same descriptive statistics for the adult and
child expanded samples, but broken out type of health insurance coverage. There are
considerable differences in observable characteristics among the different coverage
categories. One interesting thing to note is that those with private non-group coverage
look more similar, on average, to those with employer-sponsored insurance. However,
Lynch et al. (2010) finds that there might be considerable measurement error in private
non-group coverage e.g., respondent confusion between Medicaid and privatenongroup, which is supported by the fact some individuals report having non-group
coverage even though it is most likely “unaffordable” given their low income levels.
These tables provide some insight into the differences between the core and expanded
sample and help explain some of differences in the regression results discussed in the
next section.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study includes both citizens and noncitizens in the sample (non-citizens are dropped in a sensitivity analysis), even though
most immigrants are subject to a five-year ban on eligibility and undocumented
immigrants are generally ineligible. Legal permanent residents are ineligible for
Medicaid/CHIP during their first five years in the U.S. and become eligible afterwards if
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they meet the programs’ other eligibility requirements. However, some immigrants
(e.g., refugees and humanitarian immigrants) are exempt from the bar and are eligible
for Medicaid/CHIP regardless of their length of residence and 17 states and D.C. have
used state funds to provide coverage to recent immigrants who would otherwise be
ineligible. The decision to include non-citizens had a larger impact on the adult sample
sizes compared to the child samples: 56.1% of adults in the core sample are noncitizens (52.2% in the expanded sample) and only 14.1% of children in the core sample
are non-citizens (12.8% in the expanded sample). As a result of this generous definition
of eligibility, the sample provides an upper-bound on the number of individuals who are
eligible for Medicaid by including some individuals who are technically not eligible due
to their immigration status.
Table 2 compares Medicaid coverage rates between citizens and non-citizens in
the adult and child core samples. As expected, given the eligibility rules, citizens have
higher Medicaid coverage rates than non-citizens. 23.6% of non-citizen adults and 39%
of non-citizen children have Medicaid compared to 53.3% and 76.9% of adult and child
citizens, respectively. There are only small differences Medicaid coverage rates among
non-citizen immigrants who have been in the country for less than 5 years (those that
should have a higher proportion ineligible for Medicaid) compared to those who have
been in the U.S. for 5 to 10 years. However, there is a spike in Medicaid coverage
among adults who have been in the U.S. for 5 years compared to those who have been
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in the U.S. for only 4 years, which is consistent with the eligibility rules described in the
prior paragraph. Figure 1 shows a plot of this data and bootstrap results show that
there is a statistically significant discontinuity at the 5 year mark in the U.S.
(coefficient=.0468, bootstrap standard error=.0015, p-value=.002). These results can be
further explored in future research.
Tables 3A and 3B highlight the differences across language groups in the core
adult and child samples, respectively.19 Medicaid take-up for an individual’s language
group as a whole, interacted with the contact availability, is the key independent
variable of interest in this paper. As such, it is necessary to have sufficient variation in
Medicaid take-up across language groups to identify network heterogeneity; variation in
take-up across language groups proxies for the inherent differences in preferences and
attitudes towards health insurance across language groups, as determined by culture,
experiences with government insurance in one’s native country, etc…In both the adult
and child samples, Yiddish speakers have the highest (over 90%) and Pennsylvania Dutch
have the lowest (under 10%) Medicaid take-up rates among all language groups. As
discussed in the next section, the results are insensitive to including or excluding these
groups. Table 3A shows that Medicaid take-up rates among the other language in the
adult core sample vary widely, ranging from 74% among Cantonese, 68% among
Armenian, and 67% among Bengali speakers to 22% among Korean, 21% among
19

It is important to note that some language groups have small sample size (e.g., Hungarian), but the
language group as a whole has at least 1,000 unweighted individuals in the ACS during each data year.
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Japanese, and 14% among Dutch speakers. The Medicaid take-up among Spanish
speakers, who comprise 73% of the sample, is near the low end at 33%. Table 3B also
shows that Medicaid/CHIP take-up rates in the child core sample (where the language
group is defined by the language that the child’s mother speaks at home) vary widely,
ranging from 93% among Hungarian, 90% among Miao/Hmong, and 89% among Hebrew
speakers to 48% among Korean, 39% among German, 18% among Dutch speakers.
Spanish speakers comprise 81% of the core child sample and have a take-up rate of 72%.
Appendix 2A and Appendix 2B contain the same information for the expanded
adult and child samples. These tables contain an additional column indicating the rate
of private health insurance for each language group. With a few exceptions, the
ordering of language groups by proportion covered by Medicaid is consistent with the
ordering in Tables 2A and 2B. However, there is considerable variation in private health
insurance rates across language groups. For example, 69% of adult Japanese speakers
have private health insurance compared to 23% of Spanish speakers and 14% of Navajo
speakers. Similar trends prevail in the expanded child sample.
The regression models in the next section handle the privately insured in the
expanded sample in two ways. First, I estimate the same OLS model used for the core
sample, but change the dependent variable to “any insurance” as opposed to Medicaid
take-up. This model determines the effect of Medicaid network variable on the
probability of obtaining any insurance type, which can include Medicaid, employer-
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sponsored insurance (ESI), and private non-group. However, given the theoretical
mechanisms described in Chapter 3 and the results shown among the core sample, any
measurable effect of networks on “any insurance” should primarily be attributable to
the Medicaid take-up effect. I verify this by estimating a more theoretically sound
model (multinomial logit) that explicitly incorporates the choice of any private health
insurance relative to the other insurance outcomes.20 The tradeoffs associated with
using the multinomial logit versus OLS are discussed in Chapter 4.
Contact availability, defined by equation (18) in Chapter 4, is the other key
variable that comprises the network effect.21 Tables 4A and 4B provide the mean,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of various specifications of the contact
availability variable. The main specification, which has a log transformation and adjusts
for the under-weighting of small language groups, is in the first three rows in each table.
Average contact availability defined at the PUMA-level has a higher mean and standard
deviation compared to contact availability defined at the Super-PUMA and MSA level,
implying that non-English speakers are more densely populated in smaller geographic
areas. The bottom three rows of 4A and 4B contain the sensitivity specifications of
contact availability. By removing the denominator, contact availability approaches zero
for more individuals in the sample, and hence the average natural log of contact
20

I also estimate models with any private is separated into ESI and private non-group.
As a reminder: The numerator for the contact availability measure in equation (4) is the share of the
population in area j that are part of language group k and the denominator is the share of the total United
States’ population that is part of language group k. This variable is then log transformed.
21
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availability becomes negative. By removing the log transformation, contact availability
becomes heavily skewed and has substantially larger range and standard deviation.
Finally, Table 5, along with Figure 2 and Figure 3, provide a more detailed picture
on where adults and children in the sample live and the role of contact availability.
Table 5 shows the state distribution of the core adult and child samples. More than half
of Medicaid eligible adults that speak a non-English language at home live in 5 states:
California (18.0%), New York (16.3), Arizona (6.0%), Massachusetts (6.0%), and Illinois
(5.4%). In addition, more than half of Medicaid/CHIP eligible children that speak a nonEnglish language at home live in 3 states: California (26.7%), Texas (18.4%), and New
York (8.4%). Given the fact that the sample size in many states (e.g., Wyoming, West
Virginia, South Dakota, North Dakota, etc…) is extremely low, Medicaid take-up for each
language group is defined at the national level as opposed to the state or local level.
Even without the sample size constraint, defining language group take-up at a local area
level would most likely capture unobservable differences across areas as opposed to
preferences and information that the language group as a whole possesses.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show heat maps of the proportion of PUMAs that speak
Spanish in the household for California and New York, respectively22. These maps
provide some insight into how contact availability works: for each individual in a given
PUMA, contact availability is a function of the proportion of the PUMA population that
22

I would like to Thank Michael Huntress for his assistance in producing these maps.
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speaks their common language. These maps provide a good visual snapshot because of
the large share of the sample that speaks Spanish and live in New York or California. In
both maps, the cutoffs for each color code correspond to the quartile distribution of
PUMAs. For example, a quarter of PUMAs in California have between 36.6% and 81.7%
of the population speaking Spanish in the household. There are two major common
trends in these maps. First, there are high concentrations of Spanish speakers in Urban
centers, such as New York City and Los Angeles. Most of the PUMAs outside of New
York City have a relatively low proportion of Spanish speakers, with more urban areas
such as Rochester and Syracuse being the exception. In contrast, California as a whole is
more heavily concentrated with Spanish speakers. Most of the PUMAs in the lowest
quartile are in sparsely populated areas, such as mountainous PUMAs in the north or
the Mojave Desert towards the east. Second, there is considerable variation across the
PUMAs within a given city. For example, within New York City, there are 3 PUMAs in
Staten Island that have different proportions of Spanish speakers. There is also
considerable variation between the Bronx (high proportion of Spanish speakers
throughout) and Manhattan (mixed proportions).

5B.

Regression Results

Illustrative Example
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The main variable of interest is not very intuitive to interpret because it is an
interaction between two continuous variables. An easier way to understand how the
variable works is to create two binary variables (low vs. high take-up group and low vs.
high contact availability) and divide the sample into four groups: Individuals from low
and high Medicaid take-up language groups living in low and high contact availability
areas, where the low/high cutoff for each variable is determined by the mean level.
Using these binary variables instead of the continuous variables, one can view the
results under the framework of a difference-in-differences (DD) model (this example
uses unconditional means, but the results for regression-adjusted means are
consistent). The goal of this exercise is to show the differential effect of living in high
contact availability areas for individuals from low and high Medicaid take-up language
groups or in other words, determine if living in a high contact availability area increases
the probability of Medicaid take-up more for individuals that are part of higher Medicaid
take-up language groups. Table 6 shows the DD estimates of unconditional means for
the adult and child core samples. For individuals in the adult sample that are part of a
low Medicaid take-up language group, the differential effect on Medicaid take-up of
living in a high contact availability area relative to a low contact availability area is .070.
However, the differential effect (.165) is higher for adults that are part of a high
Medicaid take-up language group. The DD estimates for children are more succinct:
living in a high contact availability area for those that are part of low take-up language
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groups has a negative effect (-.0580) on the individual’s probability of taking up
Medicaid, whereas living in a high contact availability area for those that are part of high
take-up language groups has a positive effect (.0582) on an individual’s probability of
taking-up Medicaid. The overall DD estimate is .116 and is statistically significant at the
1% level.

Main Results

Table 7A and Table 7B compare the full regression results from the core and
expanded sample OLS models. I estimated robust standard errors for all OLS models,
although they are not shown in these two tables for sake of space. The core and
expanded samples in Tables 7A/7B include PUMA and language group fixed effects,
contact availability is defined at the PUMA level, Medicaid take-up at the language
group level is defined among those in the sample, and robust standard errors are cluster
corrected by PUMA and language group. The dependent variable in the “naïve” models
and the core sample is a 0/1 indicator for Medicaid take-up, whereas the dependent
variable in the expanded sample is a 0/1 indicator for having any health insurance type.
Language group, PUMA, and occupation dummies are not shown, but are available upon
request. The coefficients and significance levels for all other covariates are displayed in
Tables 7A/7B.
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Before discussing the main variable of interest, it is important to note that the
covariates in Tables 7A and 7B have the signs that we would expect to see among the
samples a priori. For both adults and children, being a non-citizen decreases the
probability of taking-up Medicaid or having any health insurance, while being female
increases the probability of take-up. Both of these results could be partially explained
by both exogenous factors (e.g., the relationship between Medicaid eligibility and
citizenship status and pregnancy status) and endogenous factors (e.g., non-citizens lack
access or information related to coverage and women in the sample have a higher
expected benefits associated with insurance). In addition, older adults and younger
children are more likely to have Medicaid or any coverage relative to their counterparts
and Hispanics are less likely to have Medicaid or any coverage relative to whites.
English fluency, welfare use, and number of disabilities also has a positive impact on the
probability take-up and having coverage. Another interesting pattern is that in the core
sample, adults with higher levels of education and income are less likely to take-up
Medicaid and are more likely to remain uninsured. In contrast, the signs flip in the
expanded sample and those with higher levels of education and income are more likely
to have any insurance type. This is due to the fact that the expanded sample includes
those with private health insurance, which is positively correlated with higher levels of
education and income.
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The two columns in Tables 7A/7B display the main coefficients of interest and
correspond to equations (16) and (19) in Chapter 4 for the core and expanded samples,
respectively. For adults, the coefficient on the main network variable (take-up rate of
language group*contact availability) is .100 for the core sample and .118 in the
expanded sample, and for kids, the network coefficients are .071 and .100. All four
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and provide strong evidence for
the existence of language and geography-defined network effects. By including
neighborhood and language group fixed effects, these models address any biases
associated with omitted neighborhood characteristics and omitted language group
characteristics that could potentially be correlated with the network variable. In
addition, the base effect for contact availability controls for any unobservable individual
characteristics that could be correlated with network size.
These results imply that for a policy change that increases Medicaid take-up by 1
percentage point, the network will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid in
these language groups by 9.9 percentage points for adults and 7.4 percentage points for
kids. In the expanded sample, for a policy change that increases Medicaid take-up by 1
percentage point, the network will increase the probability of having any health
insurance in these language groups by 11.0 percentage points for adults and 10.4
percentage points for kids. The remainder of this chapter addresses specific
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identification issues, potential mechanisms associated language-geography networks,
and various sensitivity analyses.
It is important to note that when I used the child’s language spoken at home to
define networks, I found relatively weak evidence of network effects among
Medicaid/CHIP eligible children. There was also a much smaller sample as children are
more likely to speaker English at home (results not shown). However, Table 7B and the
other tables in this section show that the results are greatly strengthened when the
mother’s language is used to define networks.

Addressing Differential Selection and Identifying Network Mechanisms

Chapter 4 described how this there could be potential for differential geographic
sorting, where people who live in areas of high density of their language group are
different in some unobservable way from people who live in low density areas, but in a
way that is correlated with health insurance rates. In other words, there could still be
omitted individual characteristics that are correlated with the key network variable. In
preliminary results for this paper, I addressed this problem by using the network and
contact availability variables constructed at the larger MSA levels as instrumental
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variables (IVs) for the same variables constructed at the more detailed PUMA level.23 A
necessary condition for this model is that the MSA IVs need to be highly correlated with
the PUMA-level variables. In addition, the IV model must assume that MSA location is
exogenous, whereas exact location within the MSA (e.g., PUMA) can be a choice
variable that can be biased due to differential sorting. If differential sorting is driving
the results, the OLS estimates are biased upwards relative to the IV estimates. In
contrast, comparable OLS and IV estimates provide evidence that differential sorting is
not driving the main results. The null hypothesis that these two instruments are jointly
zero in the first stage was easily rejected: In preliminary core model results, the joint Fstatistic was 56,794 (p-value=0.000) for the network variable first stage regression and
43,045 (p-value=0.000) for the contact availability variable first stage regression. In
addition, the magnitude and statistical significance of the network IV was nearly
identical to the main OLS result.
The first three columns of Table 8A (adults) and Table 8B (children) compare the
core and expanded models defined with PUMA variables24, Super-PUMA variables, and
MSA variables. Given the preliminary results discussed above, comparing the
coefficients of these models, without using the IV approach, provides a comparable

23

This method was used by Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005). Other network papers use similar
approaches.
24
These are the same core and expanded model results displayed in 7A and 7B.
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level of precision.25 The Super-PUMA model (model 2) includes Super-PUMA fixed
effects as opposed to PUMA fixed effects and defines contact availability within the
larger Super-PUMA as opposed to the PUMA area. Model 3 does the same thing at the
MSA-level, but excludes individuals who live in non-MSAs and do not have MSA
identifiers. The coefficients across all three models are similar (within approximately 1
standard error of the average) and for the most part, the estimated coefficients in the
Super-PUMA and MSA models are slightly higher than the coefficients in the PUMA
model. However, the policy multiplier effect is either the same or slightly larger in the
PUMA models because contact availability levels is larger in the PUMA compared to the
super-PUMA and MSA. If differential geographic selection were driving the results, we
would expect to see substantially stronger network effects in the PUMA model, as
individuals would select across PUMAs within a given super-PUMA or MSA in the
manner described above. Given the fact that these estimates are so similar, it appears
that differential selection cannot the main driving force behind the main results.
The remaining models in Table 8A provide additional evidence against
differential sorting and show that recent immigrants are more likely to rely on language
group networks. Models 4 and 5 limit the sample to foreign born adults and model 6
only includes the non-foreign born population. Model 5 also includes years since entry
in the U.S. (YSE) dummies and interactions terms between YSE and language group. This
25

I would like to thank Jeremy Tobacman for this suggestion.
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model provides additional controls for the omitted variable biases associated with
immigrant behavior e.g., over time, immigrants start to relocate in a way that is
consistent with differential sorting. In both the core and expanded adult samples, the
network coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level among the foreign born
population and is statistically insignificant among the U.S. born population. To further
investigate, I separated the foreign born population by number of years in the U.S..
Models 7, 8, and 9 show that the network effect is substantially stronger among recent
immigrants compared to those who have been in the country for five or more years. In
addition, the results show stronger network effects that those who have been in the
U.S. for two years or less compared to those who have been in the U.S. for five years or
less. This key result provides not only provides evidence against differential sorting, but
also shows how recent immigrants are more likely to rely on networks to receive
information related to the language group’s valuation or preferences towards Medicaid.
The foreign born results for the child sample (Table 8B) are a bit misleading. The
results imply that there are stronger network effects among children born in the U.S. as
opposed to foreign born children in the core sample, whereas the network effects are
stronger among foreign born and recent immigrant children in the expanded sample. It
appears that this reversion across samples is due to the inclusion of those with private
non-group insurance coverage: Language-defined Medicaid networks have a positive
effect on having non-group coverage among the foreign born population in the
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expanded sample, which in turn has a positive impact on the probability of have any
health insurance coverage. This result can be attributable to two factors. First, there is
considerable measurement error associated with the private non-group health
insurance variable and parents confuse private non-group with a state Medicaid/CHIP
plan. Second, it is possible that those with private non-group in the expanded child
sample are actually covered by non-group and are technically ineligible for Medicaid
due to their immigration status. Networks inform these individuals on the value of
being insured, but since they are ineligible for public insurance, the newly acquired
information increases the individual’s probability of seeking out health insurance
through the private non-group market. This is further explored in Table 19B with the
multinomial logit model, and further research is needed to understand the underlying
measurement error or behavioral mechanism.
The ACS also contains information on whether or not the person moved in the
past year. I find that adults who moved locations in the past year have comparable
network effects as those who lived in the same house, but children who moved in the
past year had substantially larger network effects than those who stayed in the same
house. However, the network effects remain positive and significant at the 1% level,
even after removing the “mover” population (whom account for approximately 1/6 of
the sample). A closer look at the data also shows that children who moved in the past
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year were more likely to be in poverty and more likely to be foreign born compared to
those who lived in the same house (data not shown).
Tables 9A and 9B explore how network effects vary across levels of English
fluency and health status. In 9A, I find that network effects are slightly stronger for
adults in linguistically isolated households compared to individuals that are not in
linguistically isolated households.26 In contrast, among children (9B), the network
coefficient is statistically significant in households that are not linguistically isolated, but
insignificant among linguistically isolated households. There are also no network effects
associated with adults and children that live in group quarters (e.g., those in institutions
or non-institution group quarters, but not living in a household), which provides internal
validation to the model because most of these individuals have little contact with others
that are part of their language group. In addition, models 5 through 8 in Table 9A show
that network effects are stronger among adults that are fluent in English relative to
those that do not speak English or do not speak English well. This result is inconsistent
with the finding in Bertrand et al. (2000), where the authors found that networks effects
are weaker for people speaking better English in the context of welfare participation.
The result from this study could be explained by the fact those who speak a non-English
language at home, but are also fluent in English, have a more information and a

26

“Linguistically isolated households" are households in which either no person age 14+ speaks only
English at home, or no person age 14+ who speaks a language other than English at home speaks English
"Very well" (Ruggles et al. 2010).
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thorough understanding of complexities associated with Medicaid eligibility and the
take-up process relative to those who are not fluent in English. In contrast, the welfare
participation decision is relatively more simplistic compared to health insurance
decision-making. The results in the child sample, where English fluency is defined at the
mother’s level, are fairly consistent with those in Table 9A.
Finally, the last two columns in 9A and 9B study whether networks are more
important for individuals with a disability (respondent has serious difficulty hearing,
seeing, concentrating/remembering/making decisions, walking or climbing stairs,
dressing or bathing, or doing errands) compared to those without a disability. I find that
network effects are non-existent among the disabled population, which provides
evidence against the alternative hypothesis that individuals sort by health status in a
manner which is correlated with language-geography networks.

Sample Sensitivity
The results in Table 10A and Table 10B show that the main results are relatively
insensitive to various sample definitions. These tables include 9 models among the child
(Table 10A) and adult (Table 10B) core and expanded samples. All of these models
include PUMA and language group fixed effects and define contact availability at the
PUMA-level. MSA and Super-PUMA model results are consistent and are available upon
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request. All of the coefficients associated with the network variable in these models
(with the sole exception being Model 5 for children) remain statistically significant at the
1% level and have robust magnitudes:
Model 1: Main model (full results in 7A and 7B)
Model 2 and Model 3: Sensitivity analysis over defining Medicaid/CHIP
eligibility. Model 2 defines individuals as Medicaid/CHIP eligible if their family
income is below 200% FPL and Model 3 defines individuals as Medicaid/CHIP
eligible if their family income is below 300% FPL. These eligibility definitions are
less precise, but the network effects are similar, but slightly stronger, compared
to the main model.
Model 4: Exclude Spanish speakers. All network effects are statistically
significant and magnitudes are strong. However, the coefficient on the network
variable for non-Spanish children in the core sample is only significant at the 10%
level.
Model 5: Spanish speakers only and network defined by country of birth. This
model addresses the concern that supply-side forces (e.g., differential outreach
across PUMAs) are driving the main results. Assuming that CMS does not
differentially target individuals based on country of birth as opposed to language
group, this alternative explanation cannot explain the results from this model.
The results are positive and significant at the 1% level among adults, but are
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statistically insignificant among the child sample, where country of birth is
defined by the mother’s country of birth. Further work is needed to explore the
latter result, but this result could be explained by the fact that mother’s country
of birth is a weaker and more arbitrary network definition compared to language
spoken at home in terms of obtaining information related to health insurance.
Model 6: Exclude non-citizens. The results are insensitive to including or
excluding non-citizens. I also found that that the coefficient on the network
variable remains positive and statistically significant when immigrants who have
been in the U.S. for less than 5 years, and live in states that do not have
extended eligibility rules for this population, are excluded.
Model 7 and Model 8: Exclude Yiddish and Pennsylvania Dutch speakers
(potential outlier language groups). The network effects are slightly stronger
after making these sample restrictions.
Model 9: Exclude California and New York. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
California and New York are two of the largest states in terms of sample size and
could potentially devote more resources to outreach efforts. The results remain
statistically significant at the 1% level after removing individuals who live in
these states. However, the policy multiplier among the adult sample is slightly
lower due to lower levels of contact availability in the states besides California
and New York.
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Local Area Characteristics

Table 11A and Table 11B compare the main PUMA fixed effects model with
various models that replace fixed effects with PUMA characteristics. I use the
percentage of the PUMA that is non-white, the percent of the PUMA under 100% FPL,
the average age in the PUMA, and the percent of the PUMA that is foreign born as
neighborhood characteristics. In column 2, I include all four characteristics in the model
and find that the network variable remains positive and significant at the 1% level. In
the child model (11B), I find that the network coefficient in this model is stronger in
magnitude compared to the fixed effects model, which indicates that the fixed effects
are capturing some unobservable differences across PUMAs. However, tests indicate
that there is significant multicollinearity when all four characteristics are included in the
model: The collinearity condition number for the four PUMA variables is 46.8 in the
adult sample and 44.9 in the child sample. As an alternative, I add one variable at a time
and find that the coefficient on the network variable remains consistent throughout. In
addition, the coefficients on the PUMA characteristic variables imply that all four
characteristics are positively correlated with an individual’s probability of taking-up
Medicaid. Tables 12 through 14 explore the strength of networks across various local
area (PUMA-defined) characteristics.
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Tables 12A and 12B analyze how PUMA-level poverty levels relate to the
strength of networks. I divide both the core and expanded adult samples for adults
(12A) and children (12B) into quintiles based on the average poverty ratio in the PUMA,
where the 1st quintile includes individuals in the lowest income PUMAs and the 5 th
quintile includes those living in the highest income PUMAs. For adults, I find that
network effects, based on the policy multiplier, are stronger lower income
neighborhoods. I also find no network effect in the 5th quintile group in the core
sample. For children, the trend is inconsistent in the core sample, but the policy
multiplier effects are stronger in the lower PUMA income groups.
Tables 13A and 13B provide some evidence that network effects are stronger in
smaller geographic PUMAs. I divided the sample into five quintiles based on total land
area of the PUMA in square meters, where the 1st quintile includes individuals in the
smallest PUMAs and the 5th quintile includes individuals in the largest PUMAs. A priori,
one would expect that network effects would be larger in smaller geographic areas
because individuals are more likely to have encounters (e.g., conversations at the
grocery store or the smaller downtown area) with those others who are included in the
contact availability measure. For adults (13A), I find positive and significant network
effects among the smallest three quintile groups and statistically insignificant effects
among the highest two quintile groups across both the core and expanded samples.
Once again, the patterns among the child samples are odd: There are positive and
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significant effects among the 3rd quintile group only in the core sample, and positive and
significant effects among all five quintile groups in the expanded sample with no
discernable pattern in terms of magnitude. However, there is some measurement error
in the PUMA size variable because it is based on the geographic size of the PUMA in
2000.27 The geographic size of the PUMA changes over time because PUMAs are
defined by the number of people that live in the area. This could partially explain some
of the confusing patterns found in the child sample results.
The last PUMA-area characteristic that I explored is foreign born population. I
would expect that network effects would be stronger in neighborhoods that have a
higher proportion of the population that is foreign born. Once again, I divided the
sample into quintile groups with the 1st quintile corresponding to individuals in PUMAs
with a low foreign born population as a percent of the total area population. Practically,
this is very similar to dividing the sample based on the average levels of contact
availability because average contact availability substantially increases as the percent of
the PUMA that is foreign born increases. For adults (14A), I find that network policy
multiplier effect is 31.5 percentage points among the highest quintile group in the core
sample. The coefficient on the network variable is statistically insignificant among the
other quintile groups. In the expanded adult sample, I also find stronger network
effects in PUMAs with a higher percentage of foreign born populations. However,
27

This is the most recent information on PUMA size that I can find. I will update the results with new data
if it becomes available.
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smaller, but statistically significant (at the 10% level) network effects prevail in some of
the lower quintile groups. Once again, the results for the child sample (14B) are the
opposite, as network effects are stronger in neighborhoods in the lowest foreign born
quintile group. This could be attributable to differences in income and other sociodemographic characteristics among the adult and child sample because the adult
sample has lower income levels due to differences in Medicaid income eligibility
thresholds for adults and children.

Networks and State Policy

The purpose of this section is to determine if network effects vary based on
differences in state policy design. As discussed in the previous chapter, I use an index
for state Medicaid fee-for-service reimbursement levels to proxy for the generosity of
state Medicaid benefits and access to care. I also use an indicator for whether or not
the state has outreach in multiple languages for pregnant women eligible for Medicaid
to proxy for state outreach efforts.
For adults (Table 16A), I find some evidence that network effects are stronger in
states that have less generous Medicaid fees, but comparable across multiple language
outreach and non-outreach states. The former result suggests that networks effects are
stronger in states that have worse access to providers for the low-income Medicaid
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population. I find mixed results among the child samples (Table 16B). Network effects
appear stronger in states in the top 3 quintiles of Medicaid fee generosity. However,
this might be a weak proxy for access because this index does not incorporate
Medicaid/CHIP managed care capitation payments, and approximately 50% of
Medicaid/CHIP children are enrolled in a managed care plans compared to only 25% of
adults (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007).28

Specification Tests

The results in Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 indicate that the main results from this
study are insensitive to several variable and model definition specifications. To
summarize, the results in these tables show that results are relatively unaffected by the
following choices:
The use of survey weights in the OLS regression model (Tables 16A/16B).
Defining Medicaid take-up at the state-level and Super-PUMA level, as
opposed to the national level, for quality component of the network variable
(Tables 16A/16B).
Removing the underweighting denominator component from the contact
availability component of the network variable (Tables 16A/16B).

28

th

http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=200&cat=4, accessed on March 27 , 2011.
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The use of logit and probit models, with PUMA characteristics and SuperPUMA fixed effects (PUMA fixed effects models do not converge), as
opposed to linear probability models (Tables 17A/17B)
Placebo tests that change the left hand side variable to something (e.g.,
poverty level indicators, age, welfare take-up, and marital status) other than
Medicaid take-up. For the majority of models, the Medicaid network
variable does not have a statistically significant effect on the placebo LHS
variable and where it does, the magnitude is small. This provides more
confidence in the internal validity of the main network variable of interest
(Tables 19A/19B).
The use of multinomial logit models for the expanded samples (Tables
18A/18B).
The last bullet warrants further discussion. For the expanded adult sample
(Table 18A), I ran three multinomial logit models with PUMA characteristics (PUMA and
Super-PUMA fixed effects models do not converge) and language group fixed effects.
The first two models include three choice outcomes, with non-group included in the
private insurance choice in the first model and non-group combined with Medicaid in
the second model. The third model includes private non-group as separate choice. For
all models (the base choice is Medicaid), I find that the network variable has a negative
effect on the probability of being uninsured relative to having Medicaid. I also find that
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this effect is larger when private non-group is combined with Medicaid. This could be
attributable to the fact that there is considerable measurement error among those who
report having private non-group (they might actually have Medicaid) or the fact that
some individuals (most likely healthy individuals who can “afford” a relatively expensive
non-group policy) who are actually ineligible for Medicaid purchase a non-group policy
as an alternative. The latter point is supported by the fact that I found a positive and
significant coefficient on the network variable for non-group vs. Medicaid choice among
the foreign born subsample, but an insignificant coefficient among the non-foreign born
population (results not shown). I also found similar results for the expanded child
sample (Table 18B).

Language Group Distributional Effects

Finally, Tables 20A and 20B explore whether network effects are stronger among
language groups with initially high versus low take-up of Medicaid. To address this area,
I estimated the main regression as usual, but included language group take-up quintile
dummies (instead of the continuous measure of take-up) interacted with the contact
availability measure. In addition, for this empirical test I defined language group takeup at the state level (column 1) and the super-PUMA level (column 2) in order to create
more balanced quintiles. Otherwise, the abundance of Spanish speakers would
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dominate a single quintile because take-up in the standard definition only varied across
language groups. For each model, I excluded individuals in state-language group or
super PUMA-language group cells with sample sizes under 30 in order to obtain more
precise take-up estimates. For adults, this restriction reduced the sample size by
approximately 8% in the state take-up models and over 25% in the super-PUMA models.
For children, this restriction reduced the sample size by approximately 5% in the state
take-up models and over 15% in the super-PUMA models. Tables 20A and 20B report
the sample sizes and the the four coefficients (the 3rd quintile group is the excluded
category) of the newly defined key variables of interest.
In all of the adult and child models where language group take-up is defined at
the state level, I find that living in a high CA area has a positive and statistically
significant impact on the individual’s probability of take-up among those who are in the
top quintile take-up group relative to those who are in the 3rd quintile. In three out of
the four models (child expanded sample being the exception), I find that among those
who are part of the lowest take-up quintile , living in a CA area has a negative and
statistically significant effect on take-up compared to those in the 3rd quintile.
I find similar patterns, but with more varying results, when language group takeup is defined at the Super-PUMA level. For example, among adults, CA has a negative
and statistically significant effect on take-up among the lowest quintile take-up group,
but no effect among the highest take-up group. Among children in the expanded
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sample, there are statistically significant effects among both the top (positive) and
bottom (negative) quintile groups. Among children in the core sample, there are
positive and statistically significant effects among both the top quintile group.
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Table 1A
Weighted Descriptive Statistics
Core vs. Expanded Adult Sample
Core Sample

Expanded Sample

59,377

83,906

7,755,281

10,786,093

Health Insurance Status
Medicaid
Any Private
Uninsured

36.7%
0.0%
63.3%

26.4%
28.1%
45.5%

Foreign born

77.2%

75.5%

Fluent in English

54.3%

60.0%

Non-Citizen

56.1%

52.2%

MSA Status
Non-MSA
MSA not identifiable
MSA, central city
MSA, outside central city
MSA, central city status unknown

9.3%
3.3%
33.3%
24.4%
29.7%

9.3%
3.6%
32.4%
25.2%
29.5%

Female

55.3%

54.6%

Age
Age, 19-24
Age, 25-34
Age, 35-44
Age, 45-54
Age, 55-64

14.2%
31.4%
28.7%
16.8%
8.9%

15.6%
29.8%
28.7%
17.0%
8.9%

Education
< High school
High school graduate
Some college
College+

50.0%
26.4%
16.7%
6.9%

43.4%
26.1%
20.1%
10.4%

Unweighted N
Weighted N
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Race and Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Asian, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other and multiple races

12.2%
3.4%
10.4%
71.4%
2.6%

14.9%
3.8%
13.5%
65.4%
2.4%

Married

50.8%

51.3%

Family size

3.7

3.6

Number of own children in family

1.6

1.6

Income Relative to Poverty
<=100% FPL
101-200% FPL
201-300% FPL

68.7%
28.2%
3.2%

61.8%
32.4%
5.8%

Work Status
Worker, not self-employed
Worker, self-employed
Non-worker

61.2%
8.9%
29.9%

65.6%
8.0%
26.4%

Has Welfare Income

6.6%

5.2%

Number of disabilities

0.23

0.20

53.5%

52.5%

Year 2009
Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Table 1B
Weighted Descriptive Statistics
Core vs. Expanded Children Sample
Core Sample Expanded Sample
Unweighted N

136,542

192,414

17,459,492

24,047,763

Health Insurance Status
Medicaid
Any Private
Uninsured

71.6%
0.0%
28.4%

52.0%
27.4%
20.6%

Foreign born

17.3%

16.5%

Fluent in English

65.4%

67.7%

Non-Citizen

14.1%

12.8%

MSA Status
Non-MSA
MSA not identifiable
MSA, central city
MSA, outside central city
MSA, central city status unknown

8.3%
2.6%
27.1%
27.7%
34.4%

8.0%
2.6%
26.7%
29.7%
33.1%

Female

48.8%

48.9%

Age
Infant
Age, 1-5
Age, 6-19

5.5%
28.7%
65.8%

5.1%
27.3%
67.5%

Number Family Members with At Least Some
College
0
1
2+

66.2%
24.1%
9.7%

59.5%
26.7%
13.8%

Race and Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic

8.9%

11.2%

Weighted N
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Black, non-Hispanic
Asian, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other and multiple races

3.4%
6.5%
79.5%
1.8%

3.9%
8.5%
74.3%
2.1%

5.0

4.9

Two-Parent Family

65.1%

66.6%

Income Relative to Poverty
<=100% FPL
101-200% FPL
201-300% FPL
301%+

50.9%
41.9%
6.7%
0.5%

42.9%
44.1%
11.4%
1.6%

Number of Workers in Family
0
1
2+

7.1%
44.6%
48.3%

6.1%
43.4%
50.5%

0.06

0.05

52.6%

51.6%

Family size

Number of disabilities
Year 2009
Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Table 2
Medicaid/CHIP Take-Up Rates by Citizenship Status and Number of Years in U.S.
Core Adult and Children Samples
Adults

Children

Citizens

NonCitizens

Citizens

NonCitizens

Overall

53.3%

23.6%

76.9%

39.0%

Years in U.S.
Not Foreign Born
<1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11-15
16-20
21+

49.8%
56.8%
62.8%
58.0%
64.4%
48.3%
59.0%
50.4%
58.6%
57.4%
58.2%
47.1%
55.7%
56.5%
58.8%

N/A
19.2%
21.6%
20.7%
20.4%
20.2%
24.3%
19.7%
18.7%
18.7%
18.7%
19.0%
22.7%
25.3%
35.9%

77.0%
64.1%
76.3%
77.5%
74.2%
70.1%
69.6%
70.4%
77.3%
79.4%
76.7%
73.8%
73.7%
60.9%
n.a.

N/A
33.8%
39.5%
37.3%
38.9%
41.8%
41.8%
39.9%
37.4%
38.4%
37.3%
37.1%
40.3%
38.1%
n.a.

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys

110

0.30
0.23
0.16

Mean of medicaid

0.38

0.45

Figure 5: Medicaid Take-Up Rates Among Non-Citizen Adults
By Number of Years in U.S.
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Source: 2008-2009 American Community Survey.
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Table 3A
Select Weighted Descriptive Statistics
Core Adult Sample by Language Group

Full Sample
Language Group
Yiddish, Jewish
Cantonese
Armenian
Bengali
Miao, Hmong
Mon-Khmer,
Cambodian
Hebrew, Israeli
Persian
Arabic
French or
Haitian Creole
Vietnamese
Greek
Russian
Hungarian
Italian
Chinese
Turkish
Urdu
Laotian
Serbo-Croatian
Mandarin
Portuguese
French
Amharic,
Ethiopian, etc.
Ukrainian
Albanian

Sample Weighted
Size
Sample Medicaid

<=100% Family Foreign NonFPL
Size
Born
citizen

Age

59,377

7,755,281

0.37

37.1

0.69

3.7

0.77

0.56

529
473
159
308
349

48,934
54,065
21,148
38,369
48,810

0.95
0.74
0.68
0.67
0.66

34.1
44.9
41.6
39.6
35.1

0.84
0.73
0.91
0.70
0.69

6.3
3.8
3.6
4.4
5.5

0.18
0.95
0.97
0.99
0.79

0.05
0.47
0.62
0.54
0.41

302
154
214
1,093

38,935
15,853
26,841
149,429

0.63
0.63
0.57
0.56

40.8
36.7
41.0
38.2

0.60
0.83
0.74
0.79

4.3
3.6
3.7
4.1

0.86
0.45
0.94
0.86

0.40
0.16
0.50
0.47

499
1,163
131
872
18
294
1,278
66
378
133
86
336
821
771

70,690
136,242
15,784
112,629
1,817
32,536
144,500
7,796
50,734
18,353
10,576
46,106
123,390
96,058

0.54
0.53
0.53
0.51
0.49
0.48
0.47
0.47
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.44
0.44
0.42

38.2
41.4
42.8
40.6
45.9
42.9
42.2
36.6
41.1
37.2
40.4
41.3
36.8
39.4

0.66
0.66
0.57
0.66
0.75
0.56
0.66
0.46
0.61
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.36
0.68

3.5
3.7
3.2
3.2
3.3
2.6
3.4
3.6
4.9
3.9
3.1
3.1
2.7
2.6

0.88
0.95
0.43
0.92
0.74
0.36
0.94
0.94
0.97
0.76
0.95
0.96
0.88
0.55

0.52
0.40
0.20
0.54
0.28
0.14
0.54
0.66
0.44
0.43
0.41
0.69
0.70
0.40

169
187
84

23,834
20,870
13,907

0.41
0.41
0.40

37.7
39.4
38.0

0.69
0.46
0.41

2.8
4.2
4.4

0.95
0.95
0.92

0.51
0.68
0.50
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Tamil,
Malayalam and
Telugu
Hindi and
Punjabi
Polish
Navajo
Filipino, Tagalog
Kru
Spanish
Rumanian
German
Guajarati
Thai
Korean
Japanese
Dutch
Pennsylvania
Dutch

73

8,530

0.37

37.0

0.74

3.7

1.00

0.80

440
381
1,297
357
237
43,070
109
765
158
79
792
164
158

58,934
48,052
96,999
42,497
36,205
5,817,727
15,779
67,996
21,279
10,296
96,062
20,304
13,181

0.36
0.36
0.35
0.35
0.34
0.33
0.30
0.29
0.28
0.25
0.22
0.21
0.14

41.4
41.4
39.2
40.8
37.4
36.3
36.4
37.9
43.1
39.7
41.3
35.1
35.9

0.62
0.49
0.70
0.60
0.61
0.70
0.66
0.60
0.63
0.79
0.65
0.75
0.53

3.9
2.9
3.8
2.9
3.3
3.8
3.0
3.8
3.7
3.1
3.0
2.0
4.8

0.96
0.86
0.00
0.91
0.94
0.77
0.78
0.24
0.97
0.91
0.93
0.67
0.20

0.58
0.54
0.00
0.46
0.63
0.60
0.38
0.12
0.49
0.60
0.61
0.57
0.12

430

33,234

0.05

35.9

0.45

6.6

0.00

0.00

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Table 3B
Select Weighted Descriptive Statistics
Core Children Sample by Language Group

Full Sample
Language Group
Yiddish, Jewish
Hungarian
Miao, Hmong
Hebrew, Israeli
Cantonese
Serbo-Croatian
Albanian
Bengali
Ukrainian
Amharic,
Ethiopian, etc.
Arabic
Armenian
Mandarin
Persian
Polish
French
Vietnamese
Russian
Mon-Khmer,
Cambodian
Urdu
Kru
Italian
Filipino, Tagalog
Chinese
Rumanian
Spanish

Sample
Size

Weighted
Sample

Medicaid/CHIP

Age

<=100%
FPL

Foreign
Born

Noncitizen

136,542

17,459,492

0.72

8.6

0.51

0.17

0.14

1,180
37
783
304
632
119
201
466
371

114,830
4,333
97,823
29,238
67,360
17,853
30,636
62,489
37,970

0.99
0.93
0.90
0.89
0.89
0.87
0.86
0.83
0.82

7.5
11.3
10.1
7.9
10.5
8.8
8.7
8.1
9.8

0.72
0.48
0.57
0.46
0.44
0.35
0.35
0.49
0.30

0.02
0.07
0.25
0.10
0.26
0.40
0.31
0.35
0.52

0.00
0.07
0.20
0.03
0.18
0.29
0.18
0.17
0.43

277
2,059
245
302
332
364
1,157
2,135
1,075

33,305
288,215
33,595
36,927
40,672
43,765
133,986
228,572
122,433

0.82
0.81
0.81
0.81
0.80
0.79
0.79
0.77
0.76

7.8
8.2
11.1
9.2
9.7
8.8
9.2
9.3
8.8

0.49
0.60
0.53
0.39
0.49
0.31
0.45
0.46
0.41

0.33
0.30
0.39
0.31
0.35
0.19
0.17
0.22
0.41

0.24
0.19
0.34
0.26
0.25
0.13
0.14
0.12
0.29

478
842
490
327
958
1,498
153
109,919

54,309
107,877
65,451
33,488
96,040
161,692
21,936
14,468,963

0.76
0.75
0.75
0.74
0.73
0.73
0.72
0.72

9.9
8.8
7.2
10.0
9.1
9.4
8.3
8.5

0.48
0.47
0.38
0.39
0.30
0.43
0.38
0.52

0.10
0.34
0.27
0.10
0.36
0.27
0.17
0.16

0.07
0.18
0.20
0.04
0.25
0.21
0.14
0.13
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Laotian
Llocano, Hocano
Greek
Japanese
Turkish
Portuguese
Hindi and
Punjabi
Navajo
Other American
Indian
Thai
French or
Haitian Creole
Guajarati
Tamil,
Malayalam and
Telugu
Korean
German
Dutch
Pennsylvania
Dutch

213
61
138
202
177
689

28,042
5,295
17,412
21,979
19,433
93,706

0.71
0.71
0.71
0.69
0.68
0.66

8.6
10.4
10.0
8.4
8.1
8.9

0.46
0.22
0.40
0.34
0.33
0.33

0.09
0.32
0.07
0.27
0.49
0.31

0.06
0.19
0.02
0.08
0.45
0.27

669
1,056

86,987
79,506

0.66
0.63

8.9
9.9

0.33
0.64

0.31
0.00

0.19
0.00

337
118

29,863
14,346

0.63
0.62

9.4
10.0

0.62
0.40

0.08
0.32

0.07
0.24

1,572
213

219,590
24,249

0.61
0.57

9.0
10.0

0.47
0.41

0.27
0.37

0.22
0.30

75
1,173
1,617
406

8,786
128,283
135,941
28,403

0.55
0.48
0.39
0.18

9.5
9.9
8.8
7.7

0.53
0.36
0.48
0.44

0.49
0.38
0.09
0.03

0.44
0.34
0.05
0.01

1,122

83,913

0.09

7.9

0.39

0.00

0.00

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys

115

Table 4A
Contact Availability Variable
Core Adult Model

Log Transformed Contact Availability
PUMA level
Super-PUMA level
MSA level
Sensitivity Specifications
No Denominator
No Log Transformation
No Denominator, No Log
Transformation

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

59377
59377
57119

0.89
0.64
0.41

1.56
1.38
1.05

-4.18
-4.78
-4.40

6.37
5.49
5.46

59377
59377

-2.42
16.89

1.66
71.85

-10.02
0.02

-0.11
583.30

59377

0.20

0.20

0.000

0.89

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Table 4B
Contact Availability Variable
Core Child Model

Log Transformed Contact Availability
PUMA level
Super-PUMA level
MSA level
Sensitivity Specifications
No Denominator
No Log Transformation
No Denominator, No Log
Transformation

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

136,542
136,542
132,390

0.97
0.75
0.56

1.30
1.17
0.97

-5.76
-4.43
-5.83

6.34
5.48
5.52

136,542
136,542

-1.88
10.88

1.53
49.40

-11.50
0.00

-0.06
565.92

136,542

0.30

0.26

0.000

0.94

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Table 5
Tabulation of State Variable
Core Adult and Child Samples
Adults
Sample
Size

Weighted
Sample
Size

Total

59,377

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

33
13
3,786
637
11,733
311
1,919
158
124
972
331
230
468
2,748
1,378
415
28
84
25
188
742
3,428
606
916
24
50
6

Children

%

Sample
Size

Weighted
Sample
Size

%

7,755,281

100.0

136,542

17,459,492

100.0

3,130
1,366
468,646
81,116
1,392,424
49,680
259,209
20,095
14,935
120,258
44,838
26,244
57,342
416,365
171,106
62,897
5,754
11,193
4,051
22,022
95,353
468,042
81,500
151,952
2,839
6,894
917

0.0
0.0
6.0
1.1
18.0
0.6
3.3
0.3
0.2
1.6
0.6
0.3
0.7
5.4
2.2
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
1.2
6.0
1.1
2.0
0.0
0.1
0.0

534
84
5,283
694
38,492
1,840
1,342
186
77
8,528
3,157
205
508
4,467
1,431
363
709
448
570
87
1,277
2,221
1,536
801
271
876
59

71,824
10,097
700,221
88,950
4,656,373
271,326
170,668
25,177
8,690
1,069,004
439,133
19,411
56,741
657,816
164,771
51,095
98,186
49,720
67,805
8,230
163,262
289,504
194,355
124,329
32,755
98,478
6,975

0.4
0.1
4.0
0.5
26.7
1.6
1.0
0.1
0.1
6.1
2.5
0.1
0.3
3.8
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.9
1.7
1.1
0.7
0.2
0.6
0.0
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Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

37
940
9
2,246
2,906
9,280
237
0
342
990
1,443
2,693
239
209
6
844
1,223
662
57
62
2,552
4
1,038
5

6,642
124,912
1,635
284,600
339,975
1,261,785
29,621
0
44,578
140,012
205,470
360,867
32,886
25,001
1,340
105,181
159,235
94,799
6,638
8,787
328,889
404
151,417
439

0.1
1.6
0.0
3.7
4.4
16.3
0.4
0.0
0.6
1.8
2.7
4.7
0.4
0.3
0.0
1.4
2.1
1.2
0.1
0.1
4.2
0.0
2.0
0.0

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys

347
1,343
95
3,905
1,978
10,828
2,674
30
1,275
851
1,383
2,551
451
771
49
1,044
25,101
758
49
1,071
2,850
53
980
59

58,783
179,207
14,843
504,103
235,619
1,460,670
361,723
4,639
146,795
111,465
197,752
326,039
56,755
96,769
7,408
136,268
3,218,383
104,970
6,635
146,808
348,625
5,386
128,258
6,693

0.3
1.0
0.1
2.9
1.4
8.4
2.1
0.0
0.8
0.6
1.1
1.9
0.3
0.6
0.0
0.8
18.4
0.6
0.0
0.8
2.0
0.0
0.7
0.0
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Appendix 1A
Descriptive Statistics
Expanded Adult Sample, by Health Insurance Status
Employer
Sponsored
Insurance

Private
NonGroup

19,008

5,521

22,980

36,397

Weighted N

2,375,098

655,714

2,843,547

4,911,734

Foreign born

70.7%

73.7%

69.0%

81.9%

Fluent in English

74.1%

77.6%

62.1%

49.7%

Non-Citizen

40.9%

46.8%

36.1%

67.6%

9.5%
4.5%
28.4%
27.9%

8.6%
4.1%
36.7%
24.6%

6.9%
2.5%
43.7%
21.4%

10.7%
3.7%
27.3%
26.1%

29.8%

26.0%

25.6%

32.1%

Female

52.4%

53.9%

65.0%

49.8%

Age
Age, 19-24
Age, 25-34
Age, 35-44
Age, 45-54
Age, 55-64

16.9%
26.1%
31.1%
17.7%
8.1%

28.3%
22.9%
20.8%
16.7%
11.4%

13.2%
26.4%
27.6%
20.1%
12.8%

14.7%
34.4%
29.3%
14.9%
6.7%

Education
< High school
High school graduate
Some college
College+

28.4%
26.8%
27.8%
17.0%

19.9%
19.6%
32.0%
28.5%

46.6%
26.8%
20.1%
6.5%

52.0%
26.2%
14.7%
7.1%

Unweighted N

MSA Status
Non-MSA
MSA not identifiable
MSA, central city
MSA, outside central city
MSA, central city status
unknown

Medicaid Uninsured

151

Race and Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Asian, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other and multiple races

20.2%
5.1%
17.5%
55.1%
2.1%

27.2%
4.4%
35.4%
31.2%
1.8%

15.7%
4.5%
13.3%
63.6%
2.9%

10.3%
2.8%
8.7%
75.9%
2.3%

Married

55.4%

42.5%

45.8%

53.7%

Family size

3.6

2.7

3.8

3.7

Number of own children in
family

1.6

1.0

1.7

1.6

Income Relative to Poverty
<=100% FPL
101-200% FPL
201-300% FPL

38.1%
47.5%
14.4%

66.3%
27.7%
5.9%

74.5%
22.4%
3.1%

65.3%
31.5%
3.2%

Has Welfare Income

1.3%

2.3%

14.5%

2.0%

Number of disabilities

0.11

0.15

0.46

0.10

Year 2009

49.5%

51.1%

54.6%

52.9%

Work Status
Worker, not selfemployed
Worker, self-employed
Non-worker

81.7%
4.2%
14.2%

59.5%
12.1%
28.4%

55.9%
6.8%
37.3%

64.2%
10.1%
25.7%

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Appendix 1B
Descriptive Statistics
Expanded Child Sample, by Health Insurance Status

Unweighted N

Employer
Sponsored
Insurance

Private
NonGroup

Medicaid

Uninsure
d

46,064

9,808

98,348

38,194
4,962,311

Weighted N

5,500,313

1,087,958

12,497,18
1

Foreign born

12.8%

21.0%

11.0%

33.2%

Fluent in English

73.8%

74.1%

62.6%

72.5%

Non-Citizen

8.2%

15.8%

7.7%

30.1%

7.4%
2.6%
25.2%
35.0%

6.7%
2.2%
27.9%
33.6%

7.5%
2.3%
30.0%
26.9%

10.3%
3.3%
19.7%
30.0%

29.8%

29.6%

33.4%

36.8%

Female

48.9%

49.6%

49.0%

48.2%

Age
Infant
Age, 1-5
Age, 6-19

4.2%
24.0%
71.8%

3.9%
22.1%
74.1%

6.6%
32.1%
61.3%

2.7%
20.2%
77.1%

Number Family Members with
At Least Some College
0
1
2+

41.4%
33.7%
24.9%

43.7%
33.4%
23.0%

65.9%
24.7%
9.5%

66.9%
22.6%
10.5%

Race and Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic

16.9%

20.0%

8.7%

9.4%

MSA Status
Non-MSA
MSA not identifiable
MSA, central city
MSA, outside central city
MSA, central city status
unknown
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Black, non-Hispanic
Asian, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other and multiple races

5.7%
12.4%
62.2%
2.8%

4.0%
20.6%
52.5%
2.9%

3.5%
6.6%
79.4%
1.8%

3.1%
6.1%
79.7%
1.7%

4.71

4.34

4.96

4.94

Two-Parent Family

71.5%

67.3%

63.3%

69.4%

Income Relative to Poverty
<=100% FPL
101-200% FPL
201-300% FPL
301%+

19.4%
50.9%
25.0%
4.7%

34.3%
46.2%
16.8%
2.6%

53.7%
39.3%
6.4%
0.5%

43.8%
48.2%
7.5%
0.6%

Number of Workers in Family
0
1
2+

2.7%
39.8%
57.6%

7.6%
42.1%
50.3%

7.9%
45.7%
46.5%

5.1%
41.9%
53.0%

Number of disabilities

0.039

0.043

0.067

0.028

Year 2009

48.9%

49.5%

54.0%

49.0%

Family size

Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Summarizing Research Objectives
This dissertation explores how group behavior influences individual economic
decision-making in the context of health insurance choice. Broadly speaking, any paper
that analyzes group behavior effects (e.g., network effects, peer effects, social
interactions) ought to address four key areas. First, the study must define a relevant or
interesting economic outcome. Medicaid take-up rates are below 100% and there is
considerable uncertainty over why this is the case. This study provides insight into why
some groups have lower take-up rates than others. In addition, the Medicaid take-up
process is complicated (e.g. eligibility pathways that vary by income, age, and
geographic location) and there is uncertainty over the benefits that certain populations
might face (e.g., variation in covered benefits, payment rates, quality of care, access,
etc…). Such an uncertain environment is conducive to non-market interactions among
social contacts and is an interesting study for measure group effects
Second, the study must define the each individual’s group as precisely as
possible. Some studies, such as those that look at peer effects in high school cohorts or
roommate effects in college, use rich data to precisely measure group behavior effects
and social interactions. One major limitation of this study is that I do not have available
data at this precise of a level. In contrast, I define each individual’s group of potential
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contacts by using non-English language spoken at home and geographic PUMA of
residence. Given this assumption, careful consideration is needed to determine how
these groups operate and why they serve as a good proxy for the social interactions
between individuals.
Third, the study ought to determine how the defined group can influence
individual behavior. For this study, I chose language groups because previous
sociological and economic studies show that persons who speak a non-English language
at home interact mainly with others who speak that language. It is also likely that these
individuals, especially the foreign born population, are less likely to have specific capital
about the U.S health care system (relative to their English-speaking counterparts) and
are more likely to rely on their language group for information related to Medicaid.
While PUMAs are not the most precise geographic measures, they are the most detailed
than anything available in comparable surveys, such as the CPS and MEPS. I also
develop an economic model that shows how group behavior alters the individual’s
expected utility between taking-up Medicaid and being uninsured. This model shows
how each person receives information through the available contacts in each person’s
local area. However, one limitation of this model is that it does not predict the specific
type of information that language groups transfer. For example, groups can pass along
information related to the existence or eligibility rules associated with Medicaid, and/or
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they can pass along information related to the relative benefits of Medicaid compared
to being uninsured.
Finally, and most importantly, the study must empirically identify the causal
effect of group behavior on individual outcomes. The empirical framework for this
study is well-established (Bertrand et al. 2000; Deri 2005) and utilizes several important
components. First, the left-hand side (LHS) variable in the core model is a 0-1 indicator
for having Medicaid vs. being uninsured. I also use an expanded sample that includes
those with private health insurance and define the LHS variable as a 0-1 indicator for
having any insurance. Second, the main right-hand side variable interest is an
interaction term between two continuous variables:
(1) The Medicaid take-up rate of the individual’s language group. For the core
model, for each individual, this variable is defined as number of persons in their
common language group that are enrolled in Medicaid divided by the number of
persons in the common language group that are either enrolled in Medicaid or
are eligible for Medicaid but are uninsured . This is a standard definition of
Medicaid take-up or participation. The concept being this variable is that it
serves as a proxy for language group quality: language groups with higher takeup rates possess more knowledge or information related to Medicaid coverage
or have a higher valuation of Medicaid relative to being uninsured.
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(2) The proportion of the person’s local area that are part of the person’s common
language group. This variable serves as a proxy the contact availability for each
person. This variable captures the geographic component of group behavior.
What exactly does this interaction term mean? Intuitively, for an individual that
is part of a high Medicaid/CHIP take-up language group (e.g., above the mean), living
among a high concentration of his/her language group can increase the person’s
probability of taking-up Medicaid. For example, these potential contacts can provide
information related to the benefits of enrollment relative to being uninsured. In
contrast, for those that are part of a low take-up group (e.g., below the mean), living
among a high concentration of the language group can decrease the person’s
probability of taking-up Medicaid. These potential contacts might believe that costs of
enrollment outweigh the benefits (e.g., it is more convenient to remain uninsured and
utilize necessary care from safety net providers), and could discourage the individual
from enrolling. It is also possible that living among a high concentration of the language
group can increase the probability of take-up, regardless if the person is from a low or
high take-up group. However, the differential effect on the probability of take-up will
be larger among those that are part of a high take-up group, as these groups might
possess more practical knowledge (e.g., information related to eligibility and necessary
documentation) that could help the individual enroll in Medicaid. In other words, this
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study analyzes the differential effect of living in areas of high concentration of a
common language group on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid.
One of the main advantages of the interaction term is that the model can include
dummy variables for each language group and for each PUMA (fixed effects), controlling
for omitted language group and local area characteristics that could be correlated with
main variable of interest. The model also allows the researcher to directly control for
the contact availability for each individual. The “naïve” regression results in Chapter 5
show that models that fail to control for local area or language group characteristics will
create group behavior coefficients that are biased upwards. However, it is possible that
there are some remaining omitted variables that are correlated with the interaction
term. For example, there is potential for differential geographic sorting, where people
who live in areas of high concentration of their language group are different in some
unobservable way from people who live in low concentration areas, but in a way that is
correlated with Medicaid take-up (e.g., sorting based on health status). It is also
possible omitted outreach effects that are not captured by the language group and local
are dummies, could partially explain the results. For example, it is high concentrations
of a Medicaid/CHIP utilizing language group in a local area could cause a school district
or a Medicaid/CHIP office to implement policies that increase ease of enrollment. This
effect would be capture by the network variable in the main model. Various sensitivity
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models in Chapter 5 address these concerns, and the main results are summarized
below.

Main Empirical Results
For both adults and children, I find positive and statistically significant
coefficients on the main variable of interest across multiple model specifications and
sample restrictions. For the core sample, which is limited to Medicaid/CHIP eligibles
without private health insurance, the coefficient on the network/group variable is .100
among the adult sample and .071 among the child sample, both of which are statistically
significant at the 1% level. When those with private coverage are included in the
sample (and the dependent variable is a 0-1 indicator for any coverage), the coefficients
for the adult and child sample are .118 and .100, respectively, and remain statistically
significant at the 1% level.
However, these coefficients by themselves are difficult to interpret due to the
fact that the independent variable is an interaction between two continuous variables.
Interpreting this variable as a policy multiplier, as described in Chapter 4, I find that for a
hypothetical policy that increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the network for
these language groups will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid by 9.9
percentage points for adults and 7.4 percentage points for children (averaged across all
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language groups). These multipliers are slightly larger (11.0 and 10.4 percentage points
for adults and children, respectively) among the expanded sample.
The results from various models also indicate that these effects cannot be
completely driven by alternative hypotheses driven by omitted variable biases. There
are two main omitted variable biases to be concerned about. The first is differential
geographic sorting, where people who live in areas of concentrations of their language
group are different in some unobservable way from people who live in low
concentration areas, but in a way that is correlated with Medicaid take-up. For
example, suppose a recent immigrant that is part of a high take-up language group
initially lives among in a high CA area. However, over time, this person’s beliefs related
to Medicaid change, and he/she moves away from this high CA area and behaves
differently from the rest of the language group. In this model, this person would not
have Medicaid, lives in a low CA area, and is part of a high take-up group. The network
coefficient would be upward bias because it would assume that this person does not
have Medicaid because he/she is in a low take-up area. Another example could be
related how people could sort based on their health or disability status, where
unobservable health characteristics of the individual create an upward bias on the
network variable.
There are several results that provide evidence against these biases. First, this
paper finds small differences across models when defining contact availability at the
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large super-PUMA or MSA levels. If geographic sorting were driving the results, we
would expect to see more drastic differences across the models. Second, the results in
tables 8A and 8B show that the language-geography group effect is stronger among
recent immigrants compared to those that have been in the country for a longer period
of time. I also find that the network variable remains positive and statistically significant
even after controlling for years since entry in the U.S. and interaction terms between
language group and years since entry, and when I limit the sample to those that have
lived in the same house for the past year. I do not find evidence in favor of selection
based on health status. I find that the network variable is statistically insignificant when
limited to the portion of the sample that has at least one ACS-defined disability or
limitation.
The second omitted variable bias concern is related to unobservable outreach
efforts that are correlated with language and geography. This bias could partially
explain some of the child sample results, but not the adult sample results. However, I
find that network effects remain statistically significant after I exclude observations two
states (CA and NY) that have well known outreach programs, and when I exclude states
that do not have Medicaid outreach programs, targeted toward pregnant women, in
foreign languages. I also address this concern by limiting the sample to Spanish
speakers only and defining networks based on country of birth. If outreach works in
manner that is correlated with language but not country of birth, the results from these
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models would only capture a potential country of birth network effect, but not an
outreach effect. For adults, I find that the country of birth network variable is
statistically significant at the 1% level and consistent in magnitude with the language
network variable. However, I find statistically insignificant results among the Spanishonly child sample when defining networks based on the mother’s country of birth.
However, this result could just be attributable to the fact that a mother’s country of
birth is a weak measure of networks compared to language spoken at home.
The results from this study are also consistent with the hypothesis that networks
operate through the spread of information. I find that language-geography defined
group effects are strongest among the foreign born population and recent immigrants,
whom are more likely to rely on social contacts to obtain information related to the U.S.
health care system. I also find evidence that group effects are generally stronger in
smaller geographic areas, where there could be more opportunities to run into potential
contacts as opposed larger, sparsely population areas. Interestingly, I find that the
effects are stronger among adults in linguistically isolated household, but that the
opposite is true among children in linguistically isolated households.
Finally, I find that the results are relatively insensitive to various sample and
model specification tests. I find that
Language-geography group effects remain statistically significant even when
excluding Spanish speakers and outlier language groups;
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Group effects are insensitive to the choice of including or excluding non-citizens,
whether or not I include immigrants who might be ineligible for Medicaid/CHIP
because they have been in the U.S. for under 5 years. Excluding non-citizens
decreases the magnitude of the effect, but the results remain significant at the
1% level;
The results are consistent across both core and expanded samples;
The results are consistent across various definitions of Medicaid eligibility,
language group take-up, contact availability;
The results are consistent across the use of linear OLS and non-linear models,
such as logits, probits, and multinomial logits.

Policy Implications
The main results from this paper have so far been interpreted through the broad
lens of a policy multiplier effect: compared to a world without the existence of nonmarket interactions, on average, the presence of language-geography defined groups
can increase the responsiveness to policies that aim to increase Medicaid take-up.
However, one major limitation of this study is that the coefficient of interest can only be
interpreted in terms of an average across all language groups; state policymakers must
know the details of the populations that they are dealing with, in terms of the
composition of language groups, where they generally live, and how the generally
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behave, in order to full realize the distributional effects of policy changes. The presence
of group effects might make it easier to reach out to certain language groups with
average to above-average take-up rates, but policymakers might face resistance among
the low take-up language groups as a whole.
The results from this study could assist State and local policymakers that are
looking for ways to spend the $100 million of approved CHIPRA outreach and
enrollment funds. In order to maximize take-up among non-English speakers, the low
hanging fruit for policymakers lies with the uninsured that are part of “moderate” to
“high” take-up language groups. Policymakers might achieve “more bang-for-yourbuck” with outreach efforts among this population. The results in Table 20 indicate that
network effects are stronger among those in the top distribution of language take-up
groups. As such, the message associated with outreach could be able to spread more
quickly and efficiently among these groups.
Second, the eligible uninsured population that are part of low take-up language
groups are more complicated, and there are different policy tools are needed to reach
these populations depending on their characteristics. If state and local officials are
convinced that these individuals are uninsured because they lack information related to
Medicaid eligibility and enrollment procedures, improved outreach efforts can be use to
provide practical information in terms of how and where to obtain coverage. However,
low language group take-up rates might not be due to lack of practical information. It is
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possible that individuals that are part of these groups know about Medicaid eligibility
rules, but decided that it’s not worth the time and hassle costs to enroll. For these
groups, simple outreach efforts may prove to be futile; policy-makers should focus on
improving the value of Medicaid relative to being uninsured, either by decreasing the
costs of enrollment (e.g., setting up more automatic processes) or increasing the
benefits of coverage (e.g., improving the quality of care or increasing the network of
providers that accept Medicaid patients).
Third, policymakers might want to target residents in low CA areas in order to
maximize social welfare. People in high CA areas might have better informal insurance
networks and information compared to those who are not surrounded by a high
concentration of their language group. As such, outreach dollars could be used to
enroll those uninsured who are in hard-to-reach places.
Finally, the results from this paper can be used to understand the newly eligible
Medicaid population and analyze compliance patterns related to the individual mandate
under the ACA. The ACA expands Medicaid eligibility to most adults under 138% of the
federal poverty level. ACS data can be used to determine which language groups will be
most affected by this expansion, and the results from this paper can be used to
understand why newly eligible individuals from certain language groups are or are not
enrolling in Medicaid. The results from this study could also shed some light on the
behavior of non-English speakers between 138 and 400% of the FPL who could
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potentially participate in the health insurance Exchange. This paper supports the idea
that individuals obtain information from others who are part of the same language
group, regardless of their socio-economic status (contact availability is defined over the
entire population). Moving forward, the patterns that we see with the Medicaid-eligible
populations could be similar to the patterns that will emerge among those who are
eligible for premium and cost-sharing subsidies in the Exchange. While overall take-up
of Exchange benefits could be higher (most of these individuals must comply with the
individual mandate or face a penalty and the quality of private coverage will most likely
be higher) the distribution of of Exchange take-up could be similar to what we see
among current Medicaid-eligible language groups.
There are some obvious limitations to this study that could hinder policymaker’s
ability to interpret or fully utilize these results. First, and most obviously, these results
have little insight into the behavior of English speakers who are eligible for Medicaid
benefits. Future research and data sources are needed to determine which networks
(e.g., church participation) play an important role in influencing health insurance
behavior for the majority of the population. Second, the coefficient on the main
variable of interest is an average across all language groups, making it challenging to
apply the same uniform information to all non-English language groups. It is also likely
that the network mechanism (e.g., information related to product search vs.
information related to product value) varies across different language groups. Third, the
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ACS only captures point-in-time enrollment in Medicaid. Additional research can
provide insight into how previous encounters with the Medicaid system influence the
quality of information flowing through language-geography groups. Finally, this study
only used age, income, and state or residence to determine Medicaid/CHIP eligibility; in
reality, eligibility is more complicated. Future research will use a more precise eligibility
simulation/imputation model to determine which populations might actually be eligible
but were excluded from the sample (e.g., the disabled or medically needy) and which
populations are not eligible but were included in the sample, such as undocumented
immigrants.
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